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5 
1 INTRODUCTION  
”A crisis can be defined as an extraordinary event, disclosure, or set of 
circumstances that threatens, or is perceived to threaten, the welfare of 
one or more staff, customers and stakeholders, or the integrity, objectives 
and reputation of the organization”  
- Janes 2010, 89 
 
At the end of 2013, events started to unfold in Ukraine that escalated into an international 
and even a global crisis during 2014. These events would eventually have long-lasting 
effects on nations and corporations alike. Presently in autumn 2015, the events are still 
on going and one can only speculate the severity and longevity of the consequences that 
these events are going to have. This chain of events is commonly called “the Ukraine 
crisis” or “2014 Ukraine crisis”. This research paper will utilize both of these terms when 
discussing this theme. The crisis, which started to escalate in the beginning of 2014, has 
had significant implications on the political and economic environment of Europe and 
Russia. Especially the Russian economy is suffering due to sanctions posed by the Euro-
pean Union (the EU) in the form of weakening national currency and the devaluing of the 
Russian stock exchange (Kauppapolitiikka.fi 2014a; Freedman 2015, 29). The domestic 
crisis in Ukraine in the beginning of 2014 has escalated gradually from mere protests into 
a political, economic and even a military crisis between Ukraine, the Russian Federation 
(Russia), the EU and even the United States of America (the US) and its NATO allies 
(Teramae 2014). 
The escalation of the crisis into a global one, and the economic ramifications that it 
has had for the region of the EU, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia, has caused problems for 
countries and corporations alike. Entire national economies in Europe have suffered but 
so have individual companies operating within the economic region of EU and Russia 
(Taloussanomat 2014). Especially countries that have close ties to the Russian market and 
have either export operations or foreign direct investment operations in Russia have en-
countered economic problems. For Finnish companies the effects might be even more 
severe than for others as the Russian market is one of the biggest single target markets 
for Finnish exports (Finnish customs 2014). This study will also look into these micro 
level issues from the point of view of a single Finnish dairy company, Valio limited 
(Valio). This corporation’s corporate crisis management operations in the wake of the 
crisis are at the core of this research paper’s empirical research. At the same time though, 
the larger scale of events of the crisis, both economic and political, will be analyzed thor-
oughly. 
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Consequently, this research will look into two major themes when discussing the issue 
of 2014 Ukraine crisis and its implications on corporate crisis management. The macroe-
conomic issues, themes and reasons of the crisis in Ukraine are at the core of the study in 
the first chapters 2 and 3 of the paper. These two chapters will serve as both theoretical 
background as well as analysis chapters on the crisis and its development. The infor-
mation is derived from various secondary sources, which has demanded an analysis to be 
made because there is not sufficient amount of academic literature on the subject to build 
a solely theoretical examination. Later, chapter 4 will look into the corporate crisis man-
agement. Chapter 4 will build a theoretical background for implications for what an indi-
vidual company has done when trying to maneuver in the midst of these transformational 
changes happening in its operating environment. This part of the research follows a more 
traditional academic research order. First, theory of corporate crisis management is 
looked into and is followed by an empirical research on a case company. The research is 
then that of a qualitative nature and combines both analysis from secondary sources and 
from primary data, which has been collected empirically. 
From these limitations and observations, one can additionally make the conclusion that 
this research will be combining aspects from several scientific fields. Most notably liter-
ature and themes will draw from business research, economics, and political sciences. 
This is important in order to be able to form a comprehensive picture of the crisis and its 
implication in business. Understandably, corporate crisis management will draw from 
business research and the 2014 Ukraine crisis will draw from economic and political lit-
erature. 
The research goals for this study are: 
• To describe the implications of the 2014 Ukraine crisis for corporate crisis man-
agement.  
• Describe background events, birth and development of the 2014 Ukraine 
crisis and its possible special implications. 
• Analyze the effects of the 2014 Ukraine crisis on economic activity within 
the region. More specifically analyze Finnish food industry’s exporting 
into Russia. 
• Analyze Valio’s corporate crisis management in the wake of the crisis. 
1.1 Justification for the research topic 
It is important for all academic researchers to identify the relevant research gap that a 
given study is aiming to fill.  Thus, at the end of the research the implications and findings 
of the research can be properly evaluated and new guidelines for future research found. It 
is valuable to research this particular subject in order to create an understanding of why 
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this crisis is happening and why it is taking place at this specific time. The crisis is in 
many ways different from any previous ones and there is a gap in former literature in this 
respect. Furthermore, the way a company can prepare for, manage, and learn from such a 
situation is also important. The evaluation and the creation of understanding and new 
information for theorists and corporate managers alike. The information gained from this 
research will be valuable for not only companies and their managers trying to create cor-
porate crisis management plans and academic researchers focusing in researching those. 
The information will also be useful and meaningful for national governments and inter-
national institutions, in order for them to gain understanding to prevent this kind of a 
situation from happening in the future. The research of the subject is particularly relevant 
because there has not been a crisis of this nature in the recent history, at least not in this 
scale and this complex. Thus, corporations and other organisations have no clear guide-
lines to prepare or predict what kind of outcome it may have on their everyday operations. 
This is especially true as the situation is still on going and the overall insecurity within 
companies is increasing (EK 2014a). In essence, this crisis could even be described as a 
”black swan” for many companies involved. A black swan is a crisis, which is unpredict-
able, has a severe impact and after thorough post-analysis can be seen as one that could 
have been possible to predict (Taleb 2007; Heller & Darling 2012). Generally speaking, 
these kinds of external crises are becoming more and more frequent in the world for cor-
porations. It is important to study them in order for company managers to have some kind 
of benchmarks and previous cases to look into if they are confronted by a similar situation. 
Previous literature has focused mainly on internal crises and their management so this 
research will shed light into external, which has not been studied as broadly yet. 
The learning aspect and the future implications of the happenings are also important. 
It would seem that the Ukrainian and Russian economies are suffering the most damage 
and it might take years to rebuild them (Freedman 2015, 28-30). It is not in anyone’s best 
interest to see these economies failing because the Russian and the European economies 
are quite intertwined with each other, at least for now. Corporations that are operating in 
this kind of an environment will also need future implication on how to better prepare for 
and predict these kind of events in order to keep their operations going to the best of their 
ability. 
1.2 The structure of the study 
It is noteworthy to analyze and represent the structure of the research at hand for the 
reader to be able to better follow the argumentation and reasoning throughout the thesis. 
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of this research paper through the research goals identi-
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fied in previous chapter 1. In addition, the Figure brings together the key terms and theo-
ries that will be used to answer different research goals and sub-goals. Finally, Figure 1 
brings together the research into the conclusive chapters 6, 7 and 8 that bind the different 
goals, theories, and empirical findings into a coherent entity.  
 
 
Figure 1  Structure of the study 
To describe the implications of the 2014 Ukraine crisis for corporate crisis manage-
ment 
Background events and 
development of the crisis 
and its special implica-
tions; Chapters 2 and 3 
Crisis’ effects on eco-
nomic activity; Chap-
ters 3 and 4 
Valio’s corporate crisis 
management in the 
wake of the crisis. 
Chapters 5 and 6.1 
Crisis theory and litera-
ture; Sanction theory and 
literature; relationship of 
EU and Russia; Chap-
ters 2 and 3 
Sanction theory and lit-
erature; Finnish food 
exports to Russia; 
Chapter 3 
 
Sanction theory and 
literature; Corporate 
crisis management 
theory and literature; 
Chapters 3, 4 and 6.1 
Data collection and analysis; Chapters 
5 and 6 
Theoretical implica-
tions; Chapters 7 
and 8 
Managerial implica-
tions; Chapters 7 
and 8 
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After the introduction, it is essential to establish the baseline for the current crisis 
through exploring the recent joint history of the Russian Federation and the European 
Union. The different crises and institutional changes that have taken place during the last 
25 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union are especially important in understand-
ing how the current situation has unfolded.  This is because it would seem as though these 
events are a part of the continuum that has slowly been developing in the region. Finally, 
in the same chapter 2 also the reasoning for the significance and specialty of this particular 
crisis in relevance to former political crises in the region is clarified. Next, the research 
turns its attention to the crisis, and how it has, and is, taking place, with chapter 3 looking 
into the economic and political sanctions that have been placed on numerous countries by 
separate parties during the crisis. Chapter 3 will also clarify the signifigance of the eco-
nomic sanctions for Finnish dairy industry and Valio. 
In addition to the evolution of the political situation in the region, it is important to 
understand the state of the Finnish food industry, specifically dairy industry, in Russia 
and its export operations to the Russian market. Chapter 3 will serve as a justification for 
why particularly a Finnish dairy company was chosen in the core of this study’s empirical 
section. After the baseline has been established, the paper will analyze the theory of cor-
porate crisis management. Additionally, other key terms and terminology in terms of this 
paper are identified. Previous literature on the subjects is analyzed during these first chap-
ters from chapter 2 to chapter 3. 
In the latter chapters 5 to 6, the paper continues to explain the research itself and its 
methodology, and individual methods used, in data gathering and analysis. The trustwor-
thiness of the study and future research gaps are examined and elaborated. Finally, after 
going through the research and its key findings the paper is concluded in conclusive chap-
ters covering theoretical and managerial implications and a summary chapter where the 
whole research paper is summarized and the most important conclusions elaborated from 
the research into future research, theory, and practical guidelines. It is important that there 
are actual indications on how the industry managed this crisis in terms of crisis manage-
ment and how corporations, and possibly government alike, should handle this kind of 
crises in the future.  
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2 2014 UKRAINE CRISIS 
In order to fully understand the crisis at hand and its implications it is first important to 
reflect on the history of the European Union and the Russian Federation since the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union. The shared history of Russia and continental Europe spans 
throughout modern history. However, in terms of this paper and the subjects it studies, it 
is only relevant to examine the shared history between the European Union (EU) and the 
Russian Federation (Russia). In practice, this means the time since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union at the end of the Cold war. This limitation is due to the extreme economic 
and political changes that have taken place in the Post-Cold war Russia (Ketonen & Vi-
havainen 2008, 154-160; Haukkala 2010, 68). The former Soviet Union was such a pro-
foundly different political, economic and even geographic actor than modern Russian 
Federation, that there is not much sense to analyze it.  
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the government of the newly formed 
independent Russian Federation started the so-called ‘shock therapy’ in order to stabilize 
its economy (Ketonen & Vihavainen 2008, 161).  Simultaneously, the Russian domestic 
economy was transforming closer to its capitalist, western counterparts from a centrally 
led Soviet economy. Consequently, the political leaders both in Russia and in Europe saw 
that closer ties needed to be formed between the two in order to cement and reinforce the 
new political environment in the region. Both parties saw that an institutional agreement 
with guidelines for political and economic cooperation would be the best way to achieve 
this. (Ketonen & Vihavainen 2008, 161-165; Haukkala 2010, 68.) As a result of this com-
mon political will, an institutional agreement was achieved between the two parties. The 
partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) was signed in surprisingly even terms. In 
hindsight, it was surprising that Russia was even able to force many unfavorable terms 
for the European community in the agreement, which boosted its own ambitions. This is 
peculiar because Russia has in many ways been seen as ‘the loser’ of the cold war in the 
eyes of the west, even though Russia is a completely different state and a nation than the 
Soviet Union. In fact it is important to take into account when ever analyzing modern 
Russian Federation that,  this Russia is just one of the many former Soviet states that 
broke away from the union, not the successor of the Soviet Union as it is often seen in the 
eyes of the west. As the negotiations reached an end, it is important to notice and keep in 
mind that, from the beginning of the relationship (signing of the PCA), both parties (the 
EU and Russia) have been equal and both have been able to negotiate favorable terms for 
themselves. Not one or the other has had considerable political upper hand on the other. 
(Haukkala 2010, 87-88; Wilson 2014, 263.) 
After the signing of the first agreement, the PCA, there have been many efforts to get 
a sounder and a more holistic agreement signed, that would in addition to economic and 
political terms, have implications of shared values and norms. Especially the EU has been 
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driving this goal in order to get Russia closer to EU’s values and norms. The negotiations 
though, have not been successful, at least not in the scale that the EU would have wanted. 
Rather, there have been several crises between the two parties over the years. These 
events have made the negotiations harder and harder to finish and reach a final under-
standing that would satisfy both. For example, the two Chechen wars and the war in Geor-
gia have had significant impact on the evolution of the relationship between the two par-
ties. Additionally, the crises have shown the EU’s inability to negotiate with Russia on 
EU’s own terms. On the contrary, it has had to try to find a consensus rather than force 
its own opinion, values and norms on the negotiation partner. Russia would seem to have 
been content with co-operation and agreements only dealing with economic and political 
issues. Thus, leaving its hands free to handle its domestic issues and problems near its 
borders according to its own liking, not the EU’s or the West’s as a whole for that matter. 
(Haukkala 2010, 167-171.) Therefore, a lack of a document or an agreement that would 
cement the relationship between the two political entities still exists. This, in coexistence 
with the numerous conflicts, crises, disagreements, and the colored revolutions of old 
soviet states during the last 25 years, might very well have contributed to the current 
situation in Ukraine. (Haukkala 2010, 167-171; Freedman 2014, 15-17.) Later on we will 
take a closer look on this matter and thus this research tries to determine whether this is 
the case. 
2.1 The background development leading to the crisis in Ukraine 
At the time that this thesis is being written, it has been much more than a year since Russia 
annexed the region of Crimea in southern Ukraine on March 18, 2014 (Freedman 2014, 
9). Despite several attempts on an agreement, the crisis has not reached a solution one 
way or the other. The parties involved seem to be more and more stubborn every day with 
the sole certain loser being Ukraine itself. The crisis has evolved from mere protests on 
the Maidan square in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev, in November 2013 into a full blown 
global crisis involving countries and international institutions, such as the United Nations 
(The UN). (Teramae 2014; Freedman 2014, 9; Wilson 2014, 259.) Nonetheless, the center 
of this political and economic conflict is far from the UN’s general assemblies. It is in 
Ukraine and its surroundings within the geopolitical regions of Russia, Eastern Europe 
and the EU. This research is going to focus on events, actions, and implications that have 
taken place in or closely around this region. This limitation is important in order to help 
limit the themes and issues so that they are analyzable thoroughly within one paper. The 
inclusion of the UN, the US, and the World Bank would explode the amount of economic 
and political questions out of reach of a doctoral thesis, let alone a master’s.  
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Interestingly though, the fact that economic issues and themes are so visible and are 
used as a major tool by all of the parties involved, separates this crisis from previous 
political crises. For example, the conflicts during the Cold war between the West and the 
East did not include important economic or trade questions. (Freedman 2014, 31.) They 
were rather conflicts that evolved around political questions and resulted either through 
political means or with military power. Naturally, if a crisis evolves into a military con-
flict, economic hardships are inevitable but economics and trade as the main means of 
political strength have not been used during the cold war.  Economic sanctions for exam-
ple have not been present in those days. Something, which is in the core of the Ukraine 
crisis and this research paper. 
It would seem that the political seeds for this current crisis in Ukraine have been set 
already in the beginning of 1990’s when the western nations and newly formed Russia 
started to cooperate. The profound matter at hand to which basically all of the political 
tension in Eastern Europe draws to, is the fact that, former soviet republics of Eastern 
Europe have been inclined to draw closer to the Western sphere of influence (the EU and 
NATO), both politically and economically, instead of Russian and Eastern sphere of in-
fluence. Consequently, Russia is trying to counteract and prevent this development by 
several actions, such as a customs union for Eastern Europe (Freedman 2014, 9; Stenberg 
2014). The time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union has been a series of reoccurring 
disagreements between the West and Russia that have stemmed from an event in one or 
more previous soviet republics. Common for these events is the fact that more often than 
not, the events have evolved to include not only the former soviet republic and Russia, 
but also the EU. Examples of such events are the Chechen wars, colored revolutions (2003 
Rose revolution in Georgia and 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine) and lastly the 2008 
war in Ossetia between Russia and Georgia. EU’s participation in these events has though 
remained quite docile and it has remained more or less idle. (Freedman 2014, 16-17; 
Haukkala 2008, 167-171.) The EU has usually taken the side that tries to defend democ-
racy and prevent the escalation of disagreements into military conflicts. The main reason 
for this kind of actions most probably is the economic codependency of the EU and Russia 
on each other. Neither side has been inclined to risk this economic partnership. Russia 
though found out in the early stages of this cooperation (at the time of signing the PCA) 
that it’s ‘harder’ approach got it results and perhaps this reason with the economic de-
pendency is why EU has remained quite idle. 
It would seem though that the constant stretching of political climate and disagree-
ments have led to this current escalated political situation despite the economic depend-
encies and a pursuit of peace. Russia would seem to be stretched too far with the EU’s 
and NATO’s influence closing a decisive final step too close to Russia’s traditional sphere 
of influence. For example, the Baltics have joined both of these ‘Western’ organizations 
and Ukraine has had talks about joining with both. (Pyynnöniemi 2014.) Consequently, 
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Russian federation’s president Vladimir Putin famously, and somewhat notoriously, 
stated about the political environment during the 2014 Ukraine crisis immediately after 
the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine into Russian federation: 
  
”Russia found itself in a position it could not retreat from. If you compress 
the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard.”  
- Kremlin 2014 
 
Additionally, to these political tensions and developments another key factor in the 
background development has been trade. However, compared to political development, 
the trade issues have escalated in a much faster pace during the last 5 years or so. This 
escalation of trade disagreements with the years and years of political tension together 
seem to have been the sadly ‘perfect’ combination to trigger and enable the situation that 
has unfolded. As we shall later see, the whole crisis was triggered because the Ukrainian 
president agreed to sign a trade agreement with Russia rather than with the EU. (Freed-
man 2015, 20-27; Euronews 2015; Stenberg 2014.) The trade relations between these 
three have been gradually developing throughout the last 25 years, much like the political 
situation with the most drastic events taking place after 2010. In 2010, Russia started to 
form its own customs union, which was to include all the previous soviet republics in the 
East, except Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It has been in Russia’s interest to get Ukraine 
to join the union, it has offered substantial gas, and raw oil price decreases for Ukraine if 
it was to join. At the same time though, EU was planning its own free trade agreement 
with Ukraine in order to cement the trade between the EU and Ukraine and draw the 
country closer to the EU’s sphere of influence. Ukraine was very much drawn towards 
this option as the WTO membership it holds (since 2008) is in conflict with the rules of 
Russia’s customs union. Additionally, the EU is the biggest single trading partner for 
Ukraine in 2013. Finally, president Yanukovich opted to sign an agreement with Putin’s 
Russia (long co-operation has existed between the two state heads), which angered the 
Ukrainian pro-EU population and eventually resulted into the crisis that is still going on. 
(Stenberg 2014.)  
2.2 The development of the 2014 Ukraine crisis 
The previous sub-chapter 2.1 shed light into the complex and lively coexistence of the 
two Eurasian giants, the EU and the Russian Federation with Ukraine in the middle. In 
the beginning of 2014 though, a crisis started to form that was quite different from any 
that had occurred before that. Ukraine and Russia had had previous disagreements, for 
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example, about the Russian owned gas pipelines going through Ukraine into Central Eu-
rope and the prolonged trade discussion whether to deepen trade cooperation with Russia 
or the EU (Kovacevic 2009; Stenberg 2014). This new crisis however, would become 
much more widespread, far-reaching, and would involve actors outside these three par-
ties, even global institutions and federations would be involved (Banerjee & Talukdar 
2014). Figure 2 summarizes the timeline of the events that have unfolded in Ukraine dur-
ing late 2013, 2014, and at the beginning of 2015. The timeline has been collected from 
several sources, both academic and news sources. It is not complete but it aims to give a 
coherent picture of the events that have taken place in order for deeper understanding of 
situation and its special implications, which shall be analyzed in later chapters 2.3 and 
2.4. The three distinct timeline inputs, which are written in bold, are the ones that include 
economic implications. Those are the most relevant in terms of this research paper’s later 
research because the objective is to study the economic and business implications of the 
crisis for an individual Finnish dairy company. Also as stated previously, the key events 
concerning the US or the UN are excluded from this timeline. The amount of economic 






Figure 2  The key events of 2014 Ukraine crisis (Aljazeera 2014; Euronews 
2015; Freedman 2015, 20-27; Wilson 2015, 259) 
Nov 2013
•President Yanukovych abandons EU trade agreement and opts for closer ties with 
Russia
Dec  2013
•800 000 protest in Kiev against the Ukrainian government
Feb 22-
23, 2014





•Crimean referendum results in favor of peninsula joining Russia, Russia accepts and 
Crimea is annexed 
March 
20, 2014
•Sanctions on Russian elite are placed by the EU
April 24, 
2014
•Ukrainian military start assault operations in the eastern Ukraine against the rebels 
in Slovyansk
May 2014
•Pro-Russian eastern separatist in Ukrainian provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk hold 
referendums and declare independence from Ukraine
July 17, 
2014




•The EU agrees to spread and enforce the sanctions on Russian economy.
August 6, 
2014
•Russia prepares to launch its own sanctions on imports from the EU, especially
food industry is targeted. Sanctions are launched on August 8 0214.
September 
5, 2014




•The Russian Ruble loses value radically and fast, mainly due falling oil prices but 
Western sanctions seem to be takin an affect also
February 
12, 2015
•Top EU leaders are able to break a deal between Ukraine and Pro-Russian separatist 




•The fighting and inflamed situation in Ukraine remains. The EU and Russia still have 
not found a way out in order to start to better the relations between the two
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The events can roughly be divided into five parts, between which a clear difference in 
the nature of events and parties involved can be made. This division is not complete but 
it makes the situation more comprehensible as the nature of these kind of political crisis 
is that they are multifold and include complex matters. To look throughout the events 
specifically and individually would demand a lot more space and time than what is rele-
vant in terms of this paper’s later research. The most important part of the crisis in terms 
of this paper are the different sanctions posed by each party, but in order to understand 
them it is noteworthy to clarify the whole chain of events.  
The first part of the crisis took place at the turn of 2013 and 2014. The protests in Kiev 
started to escalate in consequence to the Ukrainian president Yanokuvych’s decision to 
turn his back on European integration and opting for closer relations with the Russian 
federation. It is, however, important to note that Yanukovych was between a rock and a 
hard place. Even if he had wanted to opt for European integration, the EU was not offering 
enough economic assistance to lift the country from a looming recession. This is some-
thing, which Russia was promising to provide. Unfortunately, for Yanukovych, the peo-
ple of Ukraine were not as understanding as he had hoped. The second phase of the crisis 
started with the overthrowing of the Ukrainian government. This forced Yanukovych to 
flee the country and the people of Ukraine placed new government in Kiev. In the next, 
the third phase, completely new parties come into play from outside the country of 
Ukraine. Russia gets involved, and in a very quick motion annexes Crimean peninsula in 
southern Ukraine for itself on March the 18th 2014. The justification for this annexation 
publicly was the substantial Russian population in the peninsula and the referendum that 
resulted to favor the joining of Crimea into Russian federation. The Western countries 
join in and condemn the actions by the Russian government by appealing to international 
laws that prohibit such actions. In consequence, the West starts setting sanctions, which 
Russia counters later during the summer 2014. Sanctions will be more thoroughly ana-
lyzed in chapter 3. The downing of the Malaysian airline flight MH17 on July 17th  drew 
the attention of the whole world to Ukraine. To this day, there is no definite answer to 
who shot the plane down but the global opinion blamed the eastern Ukrainian separatist 
supposedly endorsed by the Russian government. The fourth part of the crisis is consid-
erably longer in duration than the previous ones. It is about the prolonged struggle, and 
even battle, for the eastern parts of Ukraine. This is taking place between the Pro-Euro-
pean forces of Ukrainian government and the Pro-Russia separatist in eastern Ukraine 
who want to separate from Ukraine. It would also seem that the forces in the East are 
supported by Russia both economically and with military assistance. This argument 
though has not been universally confirmed by the autumn 2015. The final and fifth part 
of the crisis began in February 2015, with the signing of the Minsk ceasefire and it would 
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seem that the situation is slowly starting to de-escalate. However, the fighting still con-
tinues in Ukraine and the relations between the EU and Russia still very much in the 
limbo. (Aljazeera 2014; Euronews 2015; Freedman 2015, 20-27; Wilson 2015, 259.)  
It is important to discuss the crisis also from a Russian point of view even though 
information and references about that is much more limited than that of English language 
media. Much of the media, and academic writing so far, has looked into the issue as 
something that Russia has, if not started, but at least escalated the situation through its 
actions with the West trying to prevent it and act as a peacemaker. Pynnöniemi (2014) 
has summarized a selection of Russian articles by Sergei Karaganov (Russian foreign 
policy analyst) in her paper concerning the crisis from Russia’s point of view. It is argued 
in these articles that Russia was cornered by the West (EU and NATO). The western 
organizations have been expanding closer and closer to its borders after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and during the crisis, Russia had no other choice but to act in the way 
that it has. Russia has done this in order to secure its credibility and to ensure that it is 
taken seriously as a partner in global politics by the western leaders, instead of being 
constantly viewed as a ‘loser’ of the cold war (Pynnöniemi 2014).  This analysis is very 
much in line what this research found about the background development leading to the 
crisis in chapter 2.1. Still, there is very little left to argue whether or not Russia has been 
the more aggressive party during the crisis, as it clearly has been. This is mainly due to 
two reasons: first, the annexation of Crimea and secondly, the military assistance given 
to the Eastern Ukrainian separatists. 
Figure 2, as discussed, shows the timeline of main events during the 2014 Ukraine 
crisis. Consequently, Figure 3 can be used to supplement those findings made in Figure 
2 by combining the phases of this Ukraine crisis with Rupesinghe’s (1998) general model 
of a violent conflict and its phases. Even though the model in Figure 3 is mainly meant 
for wars and other, more radical events, it is unmistakable that the crisis in Ukraine can 




Figure 3  Phases of a violent conflict (Adapted from: Rupesinghe 1998) 
 
The first phase of crisis can be located in Figure 3 in to first three phases of violent 
conflict. The peace in Ukraine starts to be unstable by the actions taken by the president 
and the people starting to gather to Maidan square to protest. The second stage of the 
Ukraine crisis begins by the overthrowing of the government and violence starting to 
break out, these events fit into the fourth phase of conflict in Rupesinghe’s (1998) model. 
The third part of the Ukraine crisis comes with the inclusion of other actors outside the 
Ukraine, which also de-escalates the violence when the stakes are starting to be too high 
as Russia and the EU are involved. In Figure 3 this phase situates close to the top of the 
figure. The final stages are harder to fit into Figure 3 as the situation has de-escalated and 
re-escalated continuously. However, some patterns can be found as the fourth part comes 
with the stalemate and slow de-escalation of the situation, which is though short-lived 
with the separatists in the east starting violently oppose the new Ukrainian government. 
These events can be found in sixth and seventh phases of a conflict in Figure 3. Finally, 
the situation is hopefully starting to settle and resolute, even though the previous phases 
of a conflict have been visited in the process in Ukraine.  The framework would thus, 
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found. The crisis is in its closing stages and would seem to be reaching an end. The way 
and peacefulness of this is still left to be determined. 
Another theoretical framework that fits into the Ukraine crisis was also developed and 
illustrated by Rupesinghe (1998) in his book about resolving conflicts and wars. Table 1 
describes Rupesinghe’s (1998) view on possible causes for a conflict such as the Ukraine 
crisis of 2014. 
 
Table 1  Causes of a conflict  (Adapted from: Rupesinghe 1998) 
Causes of a conflict 
Structural/root 
causes 
 Pervasive factors that are built into the policies 
 Structures of a society or politics that create pre-
conditions for conflicts 
 e.g. illegitimate government, lack of equality 
 Case Ukraine: increased tension between the 
EU and Russia, drawing of eastern European 
nations towards Europe and the prolonged 
trade negotiations between the three partici-
pants (EU, Russia and Ukraine) 
 
Proximate causes  Factors that are symptomatic of root causes  
factors that can easily contribute to further esca-
lation 
 e.g. human rights abuse, objectives of political 
actors 
 Case Ukraine: The substantial Russian popu-
lation of Crimea, the existent division of 
Ukraine into European west and Pro-Russia 
east 
Triggers  Single acts or events that trigger the escalation of 
the conflict 
 e.g. elections, increased food scarcity, sudden 
collapse of currency 
 Case Ukraine: Yanukovich declines the EU 





Rupesinghe (1998) illustrates in his model individual causes, but at least in the case of 
the current Ukraine crisis, there can be found a continuum between different stages of the 
escalation of the crisis and the different levels of causes of conflicts. These different levels 
are structural or root causes, which include profound factors and structures in a society or 
environment that make it possible for a conflict to occur. Proximate causes then include 
things and factors that may contribute to further escalation of a given situation that has 
been made possible by a root cause. Triggers then are individual acts or events that trigger 
the situation into a conflict. In the case of the Ukraine crisis, it is indeed possible to iden-
tify the different stages and fit them into Rupesinghe’s (1998) causes for conflicts as Ta-
ble 1 shows in highlighted sections with the bolded text segments. The years of political 
and economic tension result as the root causes for the crisis. The proximate causes then 
include things that have to do with Ukraine internally and finally president Yanukovych’s 
signing of a trade agreement with Russia served as the trigger cause for the crisis. 
These two models by Rupesinghe (1998) in Figure 3 and Table 1 are useful when 
investigating crises like the one Europe and Russia are facing now. Especially, actors that 
are not involved in the events straightforwardly, but are clearly influenced by the events 
can use these models to better understand and prepare for situations like this. For example, 
EU member countries and companies operating in them can find similarities like the ones 
described in this chapter in order to prepare for and operate in a crisis like this.  
2.3 Justification to research especially 2014 Ukraine crisis 
In relevance to this study, the most important part of the crisis in Ukraine is the part when 
the Russian government poses countersanctions on food imports into the country. This is 
because these counter-sanctions caused the immediate effects on the Finnish dairy com-
pany Valio, as we shall see later on in chapter 6. The countersanctions situate during the 
summer 2014 and particularly, at the end of it during the month of August. It is though, 
important to understand the whole crisis in order to make sense of the sanctions. Particu-
larly so, because the crisis in Ukraine is quite different from anything previously experi-
enced in the region. Therefore, an understanding of the events needs be created in order 
to offer managers, governments, and theory with useful information for future operations 
and research. 
At this point, it is important to argue why this research is so strongly focusing on 
Ukraine crisis of 2014 in particular and not on political crises in general. This is important 
because the fact that this study is constructed around Ukraine crisis makes this a so called 
‘a case within a case’ –study. Not only is it needed to construct a theoretical framework 
of political crises in order to analyze the crisis management operations of the Finnish 
dairy company Valio, but also in this study, there is substantial weight put into describing 
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and analyzing a specific crisis. The justification for this kind of methodological choice 
can be the fact that the situation and crisis at hand is so profoundly different from anything 
experienced previously that this approach is justifiable. In this sub-chapter, this justifica-
tion is made and the general approach thus explained. Further methodological analysis 
will come in later in chapter 5. However, in order for the theoretical and literature choices 
to be justifiable it is important to explain this choice in the beginning of the research. 
Many times during this study, the argument has and will be made that this crisis is 
different from anything previously experienced and now we shall see why that is. There 
have been plenty of political crises in history that have demanded actions from corpora-
tions operating in those areas, so why is this different and demands a closer attention to 
detail than general analysis on political crises. Laine (2014) summarized Francis Fuku-
yama’s (historical theorist from the US) thoughts on the development of EU – Ukraine – 
Russian Federation –relations after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1994. Fuku-
yama argued that the dissolution of the super power and the polarization of Ukrainian 
people would eventually lead into a situation where the difficult ‘special’ relationship 
between Ukraine and Russia would erupt into a difficult problem, which would be ex-
tremely hard to resolve. This ‘prophecy’ by Fukuyama, of the evolution of the relations 
seems surprisingly close to the current situation described in subchapters 2.1, 2.2, and 
2.3. This finding would indicate that the events between 1991 and 2014 in Eastern Europe 
has eventually lead to this crisis, which is taking place in Ukraine. (Laine 2014, 33-34.) 
It is not an individual situation separate from others; rather it is the sum of all the previous 
ones. 
This same continuum is visible in the way that Russia has acted during the crisis. Never 
previously, has modern Russia used so much ‘hard’ political, economic, and military 
power when trying to force its way with its neighboring countries. In the events taking 
place in Ukraine, Russia has annexed a part of a sovereign nation, which is against inter-
national laws. In addition to this, Russia has crawled its way in the domestic issues in 
Ukraine through the eastern Ukrainian separatists and by aiding them. (Makarychev 2014, 
197-198.)  
In addition to these Russian and Ukrainian issues, also the EU has been posed with a 
completely new situation, which has required new ways of operating and decision-mak-
ing. The EU has been forced to act in new ways as a foreign policy representative for its 
member nations. It has required new ways of doing things and flexibility when maneu-
vering between Union’s interests and those of member countries. (Blockmans 2014, 1-2.) 
This leads to another new characteristic of the 2014 Ukraine crisis that differs it from any 
previous ones, the economic sanctions. This crisis has caused the EU to pose economic 
sanctions on Russia and Russians that has not been done before. Additionally, Russia 
countered these actions with its own set of countersanctions. This is the most important 
attribute of the crisis to justify the substantial involvement of detail. This crisis and its 
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sanctions have posed completely new kinds of challenges for European economies and 
corporations operating within them. Only the future will tell if the crisis proves to be only 
a ‘lovers’ quarrel’ or will it create profound change in the political and economic atmos-
phere in Eurasia. 
 
2.4 The future of EU-Russia relations after the crisis 
The crisis in Ukraine has been one of the most profound ones between the EU and Russia. 
The crisis has even caused the use of military as it has progressed. It has also provoked 
other drastic measures by all the parties involved compared to any other political crisis 
that has occurred between the EU and the Russian federation since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. It is therefore important to look how this crisis might affect the future co-
existence of the two global super powers in the future. In addition to this, it is important 
to understand what kind of consequences the actions of each party during the crisis might 
have in the realization of the possible future scenarios. The shared history of the Russian 
Federation and the European Union has been somewhat volatile, as we have seen in chap-
ter 2.1. In relevance to this paper, this analysis is important in order to understand what 
kind of futures are possible for the region. The crisis is hopefully only temporary, and the 
political relations in the region will return to a more normal state and the economy will 
recover. These scenarios are consequently important to take into account when the future 
of national economies, industries, and individual companies are analyzed. This analysis 
will then offer insight on what kind of a future is probable for a Finnish dairy company, 
which is operating between the EU and Russia. 
Medvedev (2006, 38) has analyzed the relations of EU and Russia during the last 20 
years. From his findings, he has created a model matrix (Table 2) on how the future sce-
narios of the relations between the two parties might unfold depending on the different 
stances that the two will choose in relation to each other. This parallel analysis is im-
portant because the others’ way of acting will inevitably affect the others’ as the two are 
politically and economically intertwined as we have seen. Liuhto (2014) has developed 
Medvedev’s table further and brought it to the present day. He has analyzed the model 
and added the most radical political and military crises that have occurred during the last 
10 years to the matrix. Subsequently, the effect of these crises on each party’s stance are 
shown as the moving orange ‘explosion’ within the stance matrix in Table 2.  Medvedev’s 
(2006, 38) and Liuhto’s (2014) analysis and findings are summarized in Table 2 where 




Table 2  The EU-Russian relations scenario matrix (Medvedev 2006, 38; 
Liuhto 2014) 
 
Next, the different stances and their meaning taken by Russia or the EU are clarified 
according to Medvedev’s paper (2006, 20-44): 
Russian scenarios: 
Liberal modernization: This scenario would be based on decentralization of political 
decision-making, which would be a great change on what the first Putin’s regime fol-
lowed. In accordance of this liberalization of power, the opening and liberalization of the 
economy would also be carried out.  
Authoritarian modernization: In this scenario, Russia will opt for a centrally lead po-
litical system combined with a liberal economic and social agenda. Under this scenario, 
the leadership in Russia would base in a single strong national leader that is driving ho-
listic reforms across different aspects of a nation. 
Bureaucratic capitalism: This scenario would see the current political and economic 
elite remain in power at Russia and continue the so called ‘clan-politics’ which have been 
taking place thus far in Russia. In addition, the current trend of privatization of state own-
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Common  
Market Plus 
Partnership Zastoi Zastoi 
Fortress Eu-
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No drastic reforms would take place, as the economy would still largely base on natural 
resources and their export, which is controlled by the same elite. 
EU scenarios:  
Global actor: In this scenario, the political and economic cooperation between the 
member countries will deepen and the central authority of Brussels will be enhanced. 
Subsequently as the union moves closer to a federation approach, the enlargement will 
continue closer to Russia through former Soviet Union states in Eastern Europe. 
Common market plus: This scenario would see the economic and foreign policy deci-
sions re-nationalized and the power of central authority in Brussels weakened. The eco-
nomic cooperation would remain significant thus referring to a “common market plus”. 
Fortress Europe: This scenario sees the union reacting to global problems such as 
global terrorism and climate change by shutting its borders and creating a fortress Europe. 
Whereas the previous two scenarios will see the union continue to operate as a global 
actor at least to some extent, in this one, the union will concentrate mostly on security 
issues when dealing with external institutions and nations such as Russia and economic 
and political cooperation will decrease.  
The shared scenarios, in other words, what does it all mean: 
Depending on choices that the two parties make individually, both politically and eco-
nomically, three different scenarios, which might unfold as a result. Partnership being 
the most lucrative and positive one for the development of the region and cold peace 
being the most negative one. Zastoi situates in between these two scenarios and if it were 
to realize, it would mean the continuation of the current state of stagnation. Thus, it can 
be interpreted as a negative outcome for the future peaceful development of the region. 
Liuhto (2014) has analyzed the model created by Medvedev (2006) and placed his view 
of the situation before and after different crises. Unfortunately, it would seem that the 
situation is moving towards the “cold peace” scenario. The 2014 Ukraine crisis would 
seem to leave the relationship between the two powers in quite a damaged stage. This 
situation would have significant effects on the economy of the region. Thus, also it would 
affect the exports of a Finnish dairy firm to Russia, as EU is moving towards the “Fortress 
Europe” where it mainly concentrates within its own borders. Simultaneously Russia re-
mains to be controlled by its current power elite and no reforms to better the economy are 
being made (Medvedev 2006, 38; Liuhto 2014.) The future seems quite bleak for the 
region and everyone operating in it, if the current environment stands and no resolutions 
are achieved to better the situation. 
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3 2014 UKRAINE CRISIS AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
Previous chapter 2 looked into the 2014 Ukraine crisis holistically. This chapter will focus 
the attention to the most relevant part of the crisis in relevance to this study, the economic 
sanctions. They are supposedly the most visible and straightforward implication on eco-
nomic activity within region when analyzing the economic activities that have resulted 
from the crisis. Bishop (2009, 99) defines economic sanctions posed by countries and 
institutions on to countries as follows:  
 
”A way of punishing errant countries, which is currently more acceptable 
than bombing or invading them. One or more restrictions are imposed on 
international trade with the targeted country in order to persuade the tar-
get’s government to change a policy.”  
 
These kinds of economic sanctions might include measures such as limiting export and 
import of a specific country or limiting the ability of an individual or an organization to 
transfer funds or other factors of production (Bishop 2009, 99). In addition, to severe 
humanitarian and even military crisis, the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 provoked the Western 
countries to impose substantial and targeted sanctions on Russian economy and Russian 
individuals. Russia then countered these measures by posing its own counter-sanctions 
against the West (Aljazeera 2014; Pynnöniemi 2014; Dolidze 2015, 1). Historically 
speaking, there are previous examples of economic sanctions by the EU and the US on 
individual countries, for example, sanctions have been posed against Iran and North Ko-
rea, due to their nuclear weapon programs. From these previous cases, it has been found 
that sanctions are no immediate solutions and the effects that they have on target countries 
might take a long time to realize (Peltonen 2014). Freedman (2015, 29) states that, at best 
the economic sanctions posed by another country on another, take time to work and force 
real pressure on the subject nation. 
Sanctions should be seen as tools to enhance a broader strategy to affect the target 
nation in order for it to develop its democracy and other aspects of a society into a direc-
tion deemed wishful by the country posing the sanctions. When applying this kind of 
economic ‘hard’ pressure, the acting nations and institutions should always remember to 
use the ‘soft’ ones too. Sanctions should not be just punishments, rather encourage coun-
tries’ governments to change their behavior. (Dolidze 2015, 6; 14-15.) In the case of 2014 
Ukraine crisis, it would seem that the West has put its sanctions in place without further 
planning, or a broader strategy, which, in theory, makes the sanctions inefficient. Russia’s 
countersanctions on the other hand would seem to be just as rash and unplanned. It would 
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seem that both sides have imposed sanctions in the lack of a better plan but because some-
thing needs to be done to show strength and to punish the other (El-Erian 2014, 46; Freed-
man 2015, 27). 
As we saw in chapter two, the economic issues have been present in this crisis much 
like the political ones. The crisis is based almost as much upon economic as political 
disagreements. The trade negotiations have evolved within the region with Russia and the 
EU both trying to lure Ukraine into their own respective trade unions. This grown tension 
in the issues of trade will have contributed to economic sanctions having such a big role 
in the crisis and its resolution.  
3.1 Economic sanctions during the Ukraine crisis 
The sanctions have occurred during the crisis almost from the very beginning after the 
involvement of the EU and Russia. The EU and the US put in place the first ones on 
Russian elite and their funds. As the crisis escalated further and expanded, more and 
broader sanctions were put in place by the West to include not only individual people, 
their funds, and traveling rights, but also organisations and companies in Russia were put 
in the list of targets to be sanctioned. Russian economy’s engine, the strategically im-
portant energy sector, though remained mostly unaffected by the sanctions by the EU, as 
many member countries of the EU are dependent on Russian energy. Figure 4 shows the 
targets for the sanctions posed by the EU. The fact that the energy sector remained un-
touched might have made the sanctions a little bit less effective and holistic as the Russian 
economy is indeed very much dependant on the ability of its energy sector to produce 
GDP. (Stratfor analysis 2014; Peltonen 2014; Banerjee & Talukdar 2014, 3-4; Kovacevic 
2009.) It could also be that the EU wanted to punish the Russian government but not 





Figure 4  Sanctions posed by the EU on Russia (BBC 2015) 
Russia, quite soon after the second Western sanctions, stated that it would pose its own 
sanctions, often referred to as the countersanctions. These sanctions are at the core of this 
study. Russia’s countersanctions were different from the West’s: they restricted the im-
port of goods to Russia from the countries involved in posing sanctions on Russia. The 
West on the other hand have put sanctions on Russian individuals and companies. It is 
therefore, important to make a clear differentiation between sanctions and their nature 
posed by each party in the crisis. There are clear differences in the sanctions posed by 
each party. As it has been stated, there would seem to be three major parties in the crisis 
outside of Ukraine: The Russian Federation, The European Union and The United States 
of America (Teramae 2014; Peltonen 2014). All three of these have posed sanctions or 
restrictions during the crisis but the nature varies significantly. The sanctions posed by 
the EU have been targeted on individuals and organisations specifically involved in the 
events in Ukraine, at least according to the EU (Figure 4). Whereas the US sanctions have 
been more holistic affecting for example the immediate close circle of president Vladimir 
Putin and Russian economy as a whole. The US sanctions are also more comprehensive 
as the US has no significant dependence on Russian economy’s ability to perform, 
whereas many EU countries are in close trade cooperation with Russia. (Peltonen 2014; 
Banerjee & Talukdar 2014, 3-4; European Union 2014a.) Russian countersanctions 
mainly focus on such measures as imposing trade restrictions on imports from countries 
involved in posing sanctions on Russia. These trade restrictions included most notably, 
in terms of this paper, import restrictions on food goods from the EU and thus also from 
Finland. (Simola 2014; European commission 2014.) The Russian countersanctions tar-
geted, in addition to the EU: the US, Canada, Norway and Australia. The countersanctions 
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consist of a one-year import embargo of agricultural products, raw materials (of food-
stuffs), and foodstuffs originating from the countries listed previously. In relevance to 
this study, it is important to notice that dairy products of course are included in this listing; 
later Russia though excluded lactose-free milk products from the list of products sanc-
tioned. (European commission 2014.)  
The relevant scope of sanctions during the 2014 Ukraine crisis is the sanctions that 
have been posed by the EU and by Russia. The sanctions put in place by the US will be 
left out of the analysis. This is because the scope would be too wide to analyze if the US 
was involved and because those sanctions are not relevant in the context that this research 
is studying. In addition, this research is focusing on a company, which is headquartered 
in the EU, thus the focus will be on the EU point of view rather than Russian. 
Dolidze (2015, 14) has summarized the key points concerning the exchange of sanc-
tions between Russia and the EU in a SWOT-analysis (Table 3). The table shows the 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats from the EU’s point of view during the 
crisis when the exchange of sanctions is concerned. The most relevant points for this 
study are highlighted with bold text. In SWOT-analyses the top row (Strengths and weak-
nesses) represent the internal context of the organization which is observed in the SWOT. 
It includes things that stem from within the organization or institution on which the anal-
ysis is made. The bottom row (opportunities and threats) then represent the external di-





Table 3  SWOT-analysis on sanctions from EU’s point of view (Adapted from: 
Dolidze 2015, 14) 
Strengths 
 sanction’s wide-ranging sectoral 
nature (right targets) 
 Credible political value for 
AA/DCFTA  countries (Associa-
tion agreement/Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Agreement) 
 Already recognizable impact 
(ramifications on Russian econ-
omy) 
 WTO (World trade organization) 
and SWIFT (Society for World-
wide Interbank Financial Tele-
communication) – attack-
ing/threatening pieces 
 Collaboration with the US 
(stronger economic pressure on 
Russia) 
Weaknesses 
 Lack of unity within the EU (dif-
ferent vulnerability levels of 
member countries) 
 Lack of solidarity from the candi-
date countries  
 No fully-fledged strategy to-
wards Russia and lack of the de-
mocracy support instruments 
 Russian’s reactive jingoism and 
Putin’s rising approval rates 
 EU image hurt in the eye of ordi-
nary Russian people 
Opportunities 
 Additional impetus for the devel-
opment of the EU sustainable con-
sumption and production 
 Deepened transatlantic coopera-
tion/integration 
 Opening up new market doors to 
the local products 
 improvement of the SPS (sanitary 
and phytosanitary) levels in the 
potential market countries 
 Stimulus for the member coun-
tries to further develop a com-
mon energy policy 
Threats 
 Energy dependency on Russia 
(Kremlin cutting the supplies 
off) 
 No tangible present alternatives 
to Russian energy supplies avail-
able 
 Kremlin’s unpredictable pol-
icy/decision-making 
 Russia further destabilizing the 
Eastern Partnership -region 
 Russia developing alternative to 
SWIFT (ramifications on the 
world financial system) 
 Russia venture of de-dollarization 
(EU dragged along the US) 
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From the strengths section in Table 3 it can be seen that the sanctions are already taking 
an effect even though sanctions are usually seen as a long-range strategy with their im-
pacts realising after a long time. The sanctions posed by the EU on Russian companies 
and individuals have started to take an effect according to Dolidze (2014, 14). In addition, 
the wide-ranging nature of EU’s sanctions is considered a strength along with the coop-
eration with the US. However, Finnish Ministry of Finance (2014) point out in their report 
that Russian economy has been in the decline from 2013 and, thus the actual effects of 
these sanctions alone on Russian economy, are extremely hard to valuate because there 
are so many other things involved in the current economic situation in Russia. The op-
portunities for EU are a lot harder to realize at least in short term. Of course, the fact that 
the Russian market has been blocked for food producers creates a need to find new cus-
tomers, which, naturally, is so much easier to say than do. If this would seem like a chal-
lenge, then the development of a common energy policy for more than 30 countries of, 
which many are dependent on Russian energy, seems like an impossible mission to 
achieve in the short term. Nevertheless, it can be considered as an opportunity if the EU 
is able to achieve it. 
The weaknesses and threats side of the SWOT seems to give a more realistic picture 
of the current situation from the EU’s point of view. The lack of a coherent strategy on 
Russian politics enforced by a lack of unity in the Union make it quite hard for the sanc-
tions to take an effect. Furthermore, the dependency on Russian energy, lack of viable 
options in the short-term and the unpredictability of Kremlin’s policy would seem to add 
in to the negatives for the EU. Then again, the fact recognized by the Finnish Ministry of 
Finance (2014, 5) that the Russian economy is in a very bad shape to start with, would 
give the EU an upper hand in the sanctions. Russian economy is in no shape to handle 
any additional restraints on it, a fact that is universally recognized. (El-Erian 2014, 48; 
Finnish ministry of Finance 2014, 5; Dolidze 2015, 15; Wilson 2014, 264; Freedman 
2015, 29.) Still Russia is countering the EU’s sanctions with its own set of counteractions. 
The countersanctions by the Russian federation are at the centre of this study as they 
are the ones contributing most straightforwardly to the operations of the Finnish dairy 
company Valio, which is exporting into Russia. The EU sanctions might be seen as af-
fecting those operations also through weakening the Russian economy and thus dimin-
ishing demand and growth opportunities in Russia but in order to keep the study focused, 
those effects are excluded from the analysis. (Finnish ministry of finance 2014, 7.) The 
European commission (2015) has made an analysis on what kind of actions the import 
embargo will have on the production of food products and market performance in the EU. 
This analysis will show why the food industry and Finnish dairy industry are at the core 
of this study. The most affected sector within the food industry would seem to be the fruit 
and vegetables industry as their domestic markets have reacted strongly to the sanctions 
posed by Russia. The meat industry is not that closely analysed and its performance would 
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seem to be remaining in its current state even after the sanctions in late summer 2014. 
This is because Russia has had restrictions on meat imports from the beginning of 2014 
and these new sanctions thus do not add to that embargo. The dairy industry then, which 
is the most important for this study, would seem to situate somewhere in between these 
two previous industries in terms of severity of the situation and the importance of actions 
by the Union. The commission has found that the dairy industry has been able to replace 
the Russian demand on their domestic markets and the EU’s internal market area. In ad-
dition, the prices on domestic markets and the EU market as a whole have not reacted as 
radically to the sanctions as they have on the fruit and vegetables sector. Thus, the Euro-
pean commission sees the situation for the dairy industry as such that it will cope as a 
whole but some member states (Finland and the Baltic states) and their dairy industries 
will be more severely affected. (European commission 2015.)  
 The specific effects on Valio and its operations will be analyzed in subchapters 6.1 
and 6.2 and in the conclusion chapter 7 of this study. Valio has indeed been affected by 
the crisis in Ukraine and the sanction politics that the crisis has aroused. These events 
have made it inevitable for the company to engage in corporate crisis management. 
3.2 Finnish food industry’s exports to Russia 
Chapter 6 will take a closer look into the specific case company that this study is research-
ing, but at this point, it is important to first establish the macro environment in which the 
Finnish dairy company Valio is operating. The context that is relevant for this paper is 
evidently the trade of an EU-member country into Russia, a trade, which has been affected 
by the 2014 Ukraine crisis. More specifically, by the economic sanctions posed by the 
Russian government on food imports from the EU member countries. The research will 
look into a Finnish dairy company exporting into Russia. Finland and its business envi-
ronment have been chosen from all of the EU members because the researcher is Finnish 
and thus the information gathering would be easiest to do in Finland and Finnish second-
ary sources would be easiest to access. Additionally, as the European Commission (2015) 
has found, the Finnish dairy industry has been severely affected by the sanctions posed 
by Russia.  Due to these facts, in this subchapter the importance of Russia as an export 
destination for Finnish food industry, and for case company Valio ltd. as a part of that 
industry, is clarified. This will aid to justify the case company selection for the research. 
Food industry was chosen because of the immediate nature that the sanctions during the 
crisis have on it. Russian government specifically placed an import embargo on foodstuffs 
from the EU and a few other countries (European commission 2014). Other export indus-
tries will have been affected by the crisis also, but the effects on them have not been 
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straightforward. Rather, they are affected by the crisis through the weakening of the Rus-
sian ruble and the economy as a whole. These kinds of effects, though, have been ex-
cluded from the analysis in this study due to the limited time and space available to con-
duct the research. 
Russia has been the most important trading partner for Finland since 2007 (Finnish 
Customs 2013a, 1). In 2013, it was the third biggest export destination for Finland when 
including only the exports of Finnish goods not transit exports through Finland (Finnish 
Customs 2013b). Even though the overall export to Russia was in decline by 16% in 
January-March 2013 compared to the previous year, export of food goods during the same 
time had increased by 3%. (Finnish Customs 2013a.) Finnish food exports to Russia then 
totalled in 2013 at MEUR 430 with Valio accounting for around MEUR 350, which 
makes over 80% of all food exports into Russia from Finland. (Finnish Ministry of Fi-
nance 2014.) Though it needs to be remembered that the share of food goods of Finland’s 
total exports is quite small, only 2,5% in 2010: so national effects of the Russian sanctions 
are not as dramatic for Finland as a whole. (Finnish Customs 2010; Finnish Ministry of 
Finance 2014.)   
Even though the macro significance of Russian food exports is quite small, the effects 
of the crisis in Ukraine on the micro level might be more severe. The Finnish government 
has stated that it is extremely worried how the sanctions posed by Russia on certain ex-
ports from the EU might affect the operations of individual Finnish food companies 
(Yrittäjät 2014). The share of Finnish dairy industry of total Finnish gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) totaled in 2013 at BEUR 2,5, which makes 1,35% of total GDP (Viitaharju, 
Määttä, Hakala & Törmä 2014, 203).  Thus, the importance of food industry for the na-
tional economy of Finland is not that significant if you only look at the revenue numbers 
on a macro level. On the other hand, the Finnish food market is very centered on domestic 
production; domestic companies supply almost 80% of the total consumption of food-
stuffs. (Finnish Food and Frink Industries’ Federation 2014.) From this point of view, the 
Finnish food industry is very important for Finland, as majority of its citizens are depend-
ent on domestic food production. 
From the above facts, it can be concluded that this issue indeed needs further analysis 
and there is a gap to research. Even if the total value of Finnish food exports to Russia is 
not that significant in comparison to other export industry, or the importance of dairy 
industry as a source of GDP is quite small, there is still need to secure the future of Finnish 
food industry. We have seen that Valio accounts for a huge amount of total food exports 
into Russia, which makes it an interesting and important case company to study for future 
implications for both managers, and academics alike. This in addition to the fact, that the 
Finnish Ministry of Finance (2014, 7) has stated that the dairy industry, with Valio in the 
center, is the single mostly affected industrial sector in Finland due to sanctions posed by 
Russia. In addition, as we shall see in the next chapter 4, Valio is a cooperative with a 
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vast subcontracting network all over Finland, which naturally will also be affected by the 
fact that the corporation itself loses significant revenue on the Russian market (European 
Commission 2015, 5).  
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4 CORPORATE CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
At this point, this paper starts to discuss corporate crisis management and thus the focus 
point turns from political and economics questions towards business research. First, it is 
important to make clear what is corporate crisis management and what it is not. Heller 
and Darling (2012, 153) have defined crisis management as a systematic approach on 
how to deal with crises that the organization faces in such a manner that the organization 
can continue functioning as normally as possible and to execute its strategic goals to the 
best of its ability. Additionally, it is important to clarify that corporate crisis management 
is supposed to be a long-term exercise. It should be a part of everyday planning in an 
organization. People within the organization should listen and observe the operational 
environment in order to spot possible crises scenarios and triggers. Some think that crisis 
management should only happen when a crisis occurs. We shall see that the literature 
traditionally approaches this theme from this perspective. The biggest downfall in this 
thinking is that many times that is too late for the management successfully steer the 
company towards safety, let alone benefit from the crisis. The positive outcomes or their 
possibilities are often overlooked in crises. This is understandable as the negatives very 
often outweigh the positives, but it is important to try to make the best out of a bad situa-
tion. (Heller & Darling 2012, 153-154; Janes 2010, 89-91; Müller 1985, 40-41; 
Shrivastava & Mitroff 1987, 5-7.)  
It is very common in corporate crisis management literature to think that every crisis 
is a possibility in disguise. How the management manages a specific crisis, determines 
whether that possibility is revealed and whether it is possible to take advantage of it. 
(Janes 2010, 93; Augustine 1995, 3.) The most important thing to keep in mind when 
managing corporate crises is to remember that you want your company to survive in the 
long term. Decisions must be made fast when managing an acute crisis situation which 
disturbs the organization’s ability to function. To add to an already stressful situation for 
the management, this fast decision-making needs to be done, more often than not, with 
insufficient information. Companies that have prepared themselves beforehand usually 
handle these situations more effectively, better and assure the long-term survival of the 
firm. (Augustine 1995, 20-31; Shrivastava & Mitroff 1987, 6; Asel & Posch & Speck-
bacher 2011, 1-2.) For example, layoffs might seem like a quick fix to better a company’s 
profitability during or after a crisis but they most likely are not the optimal option for a 
company in the long-term as important tacit information and knowledge is always lost 
when layoffs occur. (Wetlaufer 1998, 143-144; Asel et al. 2011, 1-2).  Of course, some-
times these kinds of actions are inevitable if the company faces crucial financial problems 
in the short-term due to a crisis. In addition, to these issues a profound question concern-
ing corporate crises is whether the crisis is stemming internally, or is it a menace emerging 
outside the company. 
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The concept of corporate crisis management as a field has been studied widely for 
many years. The basic research, though, has mostly been looking at crises stemming from 
inside the company through management failure or some other internal shortcoming of 
the organization. (Müller 1985, 38.) Modern literature has found however, that we are 
now entering into a new era where unprecedented external corporate crises, such as po-
litical or governmental crises, are occurring more and more despite the actions of corpo-
rate management (Heller & Darling 2012, 152). The Ukraine crisis of 2014 and its effects 
on corporations operating in the economic region, clearly form a crisis that has evolved 
and escalated without any input by the individual companies operating within the eco-
nomic region. Despite this fact, the sanctions posed by the Russian government on food 
imports from the EU have affected the Finnish dairy companies and have forced Valio as 
one of them to act; hence, the crisis has required the Finnish dairy company Valio, which 
is exporting to Russia to engage in corporate crisis management. At this point, it is worth-
while to underline the fact that the financial effect that the Ukraine crisis has had on Valio 
clearly puts the company into a crisis situation. This issue will be looked more closely in 
chapter 6, but it is important to justify that the situation indeed called for corporate crisis 
management in order for this chapter to be relevant for the research. 
4.1 Defining corporate crises                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Corporate crises are often called also organizational crises, especially in business litera-
ture and research. The fundamental meaning of the two is the same and thus they are often 
used simultaneously in papers and studies alike. In this research also, both of these con-
cepts are present but corporate crisis is viable because corporate crisis management offers 
the practical theoretical framework for this study. Pearson and Clair (1998, 60) have made 
a holistic and profound definition for organizational crises based on a number of studies 
on the subject that in many ways confirms the statements and findings made in this study 
concerning the subject of corporate crisis: 
 
“An organizational crisis is a low-probability, high-impact event that 
threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized by ambigu-
ity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that 
decisions must be made swiftly.” 
 
Previously in this chapter, it was stated that the basic literature on corporate crisis 
management has focused mainly on internal crises. In addition to Pearson’s and Clair’s 
(1998, 60) fundamental definition of corporate crisis it is important for the objective of 
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this study to define whether the crisis is internal or external. Traditional literature con-
centrates on internal crises but during the last two decades, and especially after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, hurricane Katrina, and the economic crises of late, the focus on research 
has started to shift towards the management of external crises. These are crises, which 
have an effect on a specific company operating within a specific context, which the crisis 
affects. These effects may be either direct or indirect. In addition to the change in corpo-
rate crisis management literature, the same kind of shift can naturally be witnessed in the 
kinds of actual crises taking place in corporations. Whether the crisis is internal or exter-
nal also affects the way that the organization is perceived to act during it. Traditionally, 
crisis management literature has seen the organization as a victim when discussing exter-
nal crises. This is because internal crises are seen as something that is induced by human 
actions and external ones as something else, something that the management is not able 
to affect because the human dimension is not as evident as in internal cases. Corporations 
in external crises have been put there by outside happenings out of their reach so to speak. 
(Crandall et al. 2014.)  
Previous literature on corporate crises and their management on crises stemming from 
outside the company has been mainly dealing with radical and extreme changes in the 
company’s external operating environment. These changes have usually been perceived 
as being something that radically endangers the survival of the company or its employees 
for example. Examples of these incidents include such things as terrorism, fires, or 
weather disasters. (Crandall & Parnell & Spillan 2014, 1; Huzey et al 2014, 3; Shrivastava 
& Mitroff 1987, 1-2.) After the 2008 global financial and economic crisis the scope has 
been widening and crises are not seen as only the most crucial and devastating events that 
risk the very fundamental survival of a company. Rather, a crisis might be something that 
disrupts the everyday operations of a firm that requires actions to be taken in order to 
ensure that the company can continue operating and return to normal state as soon as 
possible. (Asel et al. 2011, 1-2; Heller & Darling 2012, 152-153; Müller 1985, 1; Janes 
2010, 89.) A good example of this is the 2007 crisis that hit Toyota car manufacturing 
company, which had to pull tens of thousands of cars back to its factories in order to 
undergo crucial security repairs (Heller & Darling 2012, 159). This crisis did stem from 
inside the company but it had elements of external crisis management, as the potential PR 
damage was substantial. This crisis severely harmed the company’s reputation and reve-
nue in the US market but the company’s fundamental existence was not in doubt. This 
example describes well the complexity and multidimensional nature of corporate crisis 
management. This research paper also applies the broader concept of corporate crises and 
their management, as we will see later when the case company and its actions are in the 
focus.  
We have now seen that a crisis does not need to be a profound disaster such as hurri-
cane Katrina in New Orleans but also a conflict, political tension, trade restriction et 
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cetera, can cause an individual company substantial harm in its operations and future 
prospects; this is the context and discourse that this research addresses in terms of corpo-
rate crises. The Ukraine crisis is still somewhat a mild conflict compared to full frontal 
wars between nations or natural disasters taking out factories, other buildings, or entire 
infrastructures completely. Still the effects that the crisis has had on an individual Finnish 
dairy company seem to be far reaching and challenging to say the least. Chapter 6 will 
take a closer look on how Valio has been affected by the crisis and what kind of implica-
tions it has had on the operations of the company. In this chapter 4 it is important to 
determine how a company can best react and prepare for a crisis on a general level. The 
theoretical findings will then be drawn into practicality through the case of Valio in later 
on. 
 
4.2 Crisis management process in theory 
The literature and former theory on corporate crisis management is unanimous on the fact 
that these themes and issues are something that companies everywhere, despite their size 
or stature, should take into account in their everyday operations (Huzey & Betts & Vicari 
2014, 2-3; Janes 2010, 89). Additionally, crisis management is not just something a firm 
does when it confronts a crisis; many times, it is far too late to act if the situation has 
reached that point (Huzey et al. 2014, 2-3). It has even been stated that 80% of companies 
that lack a sufficient plans to operate in radical crisis, that puts the company’s very exist-
ence into question, go out of business in 2 years after a crisis hits (Brown 1993). Even if 
the literature agrees on this, the way a company should prepare, manage and continue 
operations after a crisis hits, is not as unanimous in former research on the subject. This 
subchapter looks into various researchers’ findings and further enhances their findings 
into a coherent model of how a company should prepare and operate its crisis manage-
ment process. 
 The research on corporate crisis management started to form in the beginning of 
1980 with articles published in small numbers until the beginning of 21st century. Espe-
cially the US as a nation and as a national economy suffered severe disasters during the 
first ten years into the new century. 2001 the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center 
in New York City and the most disastrous hurricane ever to hit the US in New Orleans in 
2005 shattered the businesses and society. These events according to Crandall et al. 
(2014) are the main reasons and justification for why corporate crisis management liter-
ature, and subsequently article numbers, has exploded after 2006. In addition, the dis-
course in the articles, as shown in the previous subchapter 4.1 has changed to include 
more external crises that need managing as well as traditional internal ones. The operating 
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guidelines from theory for corporate crisis management has remained quite similar 
throughout the years but as it is in the nature of research, when it is conducted more, also 
the implications start to differ and multiply. 
Traditionally corporate crisis management has been seen in literature as a three-stage 
process. Figure 5 represents this kind of thinking.  
  
Figure 5  Crisis management measures process (Crandall et al. 2014) 
The traditional view includes three different stages of corporate crisis management: 1) 
preliminary crisis management (pre-crisis management), 2) acute crisis management and 
3) post-crisis management. (Crandall et al. 2014.) Pre-crisis management is about plan-
ning, creating action plans, forming crisis management teams for different crisis scenarios 
beforehand and orchestrating crisis audits in order to prepare the organization to face the 
unthinkable in its best possible form and ability. The way that these three distinct exer-
cises in this first stage appear is quite straightforward. Crisis audits are, or rather should 
be, done regularly in all businesses. They are about analyzing the operating environment 
actively and identifying possible crisis scenarios. From these findings, coherent plans 
should be drawn on how a company confronts a specific crisis scenario and finally a spe-
cific team should be created that takes the reins so to speak if that scenario presents itself. 
The kind of basic assumption for pre-crisis management traditionally is that there is a 
crisis in the horizon that needs to be prepared for. (Shrivastava & Mitroff 1987, 9; Cran-
dall et al. 2014; Heller & Darling 2012, 152).   
When the crisis is identified and the company cannot avoid it, the second-phase, the 
acute crisis management phase, of crisis management begins. The organization needs 
to be steered clear of the crisis as soon as possible with as little damage and harm ensued 
on its operations. In an ideal situation, the crisis scenario that the company has encoun-
tered has been identified in the regular crisis audits and the crisis management operations 
can begin as soon as possible. This is because, it is important for the management to be 
able to make decisions and make them fast. This is extremely more efficient if there are 
some kinds of prepared starting points or guidelines which to follow. Usually, the crisis 
management team and its readymade plans are activated in this stage, if they have been 








way out would seem to be to adjust the finances of the company through layoffs for ex-
ample. These kinds of actions though, often put the long-term survival of the firm in dan-
ger even if the crisis is handled and company is able to continue its functions normally. 
(Crandall et al. 2014; Janes 2010, 89; Asel et al. 2010, 214; Müller 1985, 44-45.)  
The final phase is the post-crisis management. The most important things to achieve 
here are to ensure that the absolute most is made out of the crisis situation. Everything 
positive that there is to gain must be taken advantage of and usually in every crisis; there 
are positive possibilities if previous phases have been handled accordingly. (Heller & 
Darling 2012, 163-164; Crandall et al. 2014.)   
Regardless of the scale or strategic relevance of the crisis for a company, the top man-
agement should always be included in crisis management during all stages and they 
should contribute to them. Many times though, if the crisis is large in scale or if it holds 
significant importance in relevance to the company strategy, top management team often 
transform into the crisis management team itself and does not delegate the responsibility 
at all. This is a good practice because if the crisis is large in scale and has strategic sig-
nificance, the only people that have the power to make decisions of that magnitude are 
the top management. (Shrivastava & Mitroff 1987, 5; Janes 2010, 91.)  
The latter research has started to include other measures on top of these three basic 
management phases. The main evolution in the findings compared to traditional literature 
is the nature of corporate crisis management. The same three phases are still present but 
the process of corporate crisis management is seen more as an ongoing function that needs 
to be done all the time even if an actual crisis is not insight. The word ‘function’, in this 
respect, does not imply that corporate crisis management should be a separate organiza-
tional function, but it is something that everyone in the organization should do as a part 
of his or her everyday functions. The emphasis then is on the first phase of pre-crisis 
management. Strategic and operational planning and analyzing should be done all the 
time both internally and externally. Thus, the crisis audits and their importance are en-
hanced and they should be present all the time. (Heller & Darling 2012, 155; Crandall et 
al. 2014; Shrivastava & Mitroff 1987, 6-7; Janes 2010, 89-90; Selart & Johansen & Nesse 
2013, 99-101.) For example, export companies need to analyze their export markets all 
the time and try and find implications of possible crisis scenarios even if there necessarily 
is no evident reason to do so (Müller 1985, 42). Some researchers make a distinction 
between these efforts and corporate crisis management. They see the pre-emptive 
measures as a completely different research field from corporate crisis management; this 
field is called crisis prevention (Selart et al. 2013, 99). This study though views crisis 
prevention as a part of corporate crisis management and includes those issues into find-
ings concerning corporate crisis management. This is because the two are very much in-
tertwined and the joining of the two offers a much more coherent picture of the actions 
concerning corporations in crises and preparing for them. 
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From these findings and analysis of former literature and research, we can make the 
conclusion that instead of a straightforward event based process, like the one in Figure 5, 
the corporate crisis management function can be seen rather as a cycle process. Figure 6 
displays the model for this kind of thinking on corporate crisis management.  
 
  
Figure 6  Corporate crisis management as a cycle process (Adapted from: 
Shrivastava & Mitroff 1987, 6-7, 9; Crandall et al. 2014; Heller & 
Darling 2012, 152, 155, 163-164; Janes 2010, 89-90; Asel et al. 2010, 
214; Müller 1985, 44-45; Selart et al. 2013, 99-101) 
It shows the process as a never ending cycle where an organization prepares for a crisis 
all the time in the background and when a crisis hits the prepared plans and strategies take 
an effect and crisis management takes the stage. After the organization is steered clear of 
the crisis, it is time to learn from it and return operations in their normal state. All the 
lessons from the crisis must be taken into account and thus ensure that the organization 
learns from it in case of the future. (Heller & Darling 2012, 163-164; Crandall et al. 2014.)  
If anything, there is always something to be learned from each crisis situation that has 
befallen the company for the crisis management. Even if there is nothing else to be 












organization in its 




crisis management can be enhanced after each crisis in order for the company to be better 
prepared for a future crisis. After all this this, the crisis management function returns to 
its background stance and planning continues after the lessons are learned from the latest 
crisis.  
4.3 External crises - management point of view 
In chapter 4.1, we saw how corporate crises could be divided into two distinct categories 
according to whether they appear inside or outside the company. We concluded that the 
Ukraine crisis of 2014 and its effects on Finnish dairy company Valio most definitely is 
an external crisis from Valio’s point of view. This subchapter will now look into external 
corporate crisis management and its specific special implications of how a company 
should position itself and what kind of actions there are to be taken in order to handle an 
external crisis to the best of its ability.  
A common perception amongst corporate managers is to tend to handle and think of 
conflicts, such as the 2014 Ukraine crisis, as nation-wide or macro-level issues. This leads 
to the inevitable conclusions that managers rarely think that they should or even can try 
to influence happenings when these kinds of conflicts take place in their operating envi-
ronment. (Zandvliet 2005, 3). Corporate crisis management literature though identifies 
two different kinds of crises that affect companies and thus require actions from manage-
ment. These two are internal and external as we saw in chapter 4.1. The literature has 
concentrated on the previous and perhaps this is the reason why also management tends 
to look at macro-level environment more as something that they cannot affect and that 
has led to ignorance at some level. (Shrivastava & Mitroff 1987 5; Heller & Darling 2012, 
152.) Of course, it needs to be remembered that external crises might include natural dis-
asters such as the hurricane Katrina, which is clearly beyond the scope of any human to 
try to influence. The aftermath of such an incident is though humanly controlled and there 
might be a window of opportunity to influence and have an effect by corporate managers. 
Banfield et al. (2005, 141-142) have recognized three distinct strategies for managers 
to handle situations where their company has fallen into a situation of a conflict, which 
takes place in its operating environment. These conflicts that Banfield (2005) is discuss-
ing are conflicts that stem from human actions, such as military, economic, political, or 
even war. The three strategies that Banfield has recognized are not excluding each other 
but rather complementary. These different strategies are illustrated below in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7  Strategies for corporations to manage company-conflict impacts 
(Banfield et al. 2005, 141-142) 
The bottom tier of compliance represents the very least a company should do in a 
conflict situation. This means that the company acts according to local authorities and 
does not question the status quo that is taking place. Company merely makes sure that its 
own survival is not endangered. Peacebuilding on the top of the pyramid stands for the 
strategy for the most a company can do when operating in a conflict situation. In this 
strategy, the company actively contributes to the conflict situation in a way that would 
shorten or resolve the conflict so that peace might be achieved. In between these two there 
is the “Do no harm” –tier, which stands for a strategy where company does not actively 
try and better the situation but try and prevent any negative outcomes that their actions 
might have on the situation. (Banfield et al. 2005, 141-142.) It is important to take into 
account that companies can affect governments and other actors through other networks 
than just the local in the host country. Corporations can for example co-operate with their 
home governments or institutions in order to influence host governments and institutions. 
(Zandvliet 2005, 7-8).  
Many of these findings are relevant only for very big companies that can have an in-
fluence on a situation on a larger scale and not just in its own immediate environment. 
However, perhaps, what there is to learn from this simple graph from Banfield et al. 
(2005, 141-142) and the findings by Zandvliet (2005, 7-8) is that a company should not 
be idle when things are happening in its macro environment. Perhaps a company, despite 
its size, should be extra careful and ‘listen’ to every possible signal that might help it to 
figure out what is going on and possibly even try and affect it through its networks even 
if there seemingly is no way that the company can affect the situation. At the very least, 
Peacebuilding
Finally, companies may be able 
to contribute to peace-building.
"Do no harm"
Beyond compliance, corporations should 
be aware that they might influence to 
conflict negatively 'subcontsiously' and 
should try to prevent this. 
Compliance
Companies should obey national laws and regulations just as 
international ones. This includes also emerging normative 
framework in an crisis situation.
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this kind of a stance would enhance the capability of the corporation to actively analyze 
the situation. This then could lead to spot possible positive outcomes of the situation. In 
addition, a more thorough understanding of the crisis and its reasons would be created, 
which then contributes to the learning curve of corporate crisis management. 
4.4 Corporate crisis communication 
No matter what kind of a crisis is in question for the company, internal or external, it 
always puts pressure on the communications. The influence and value of communications 
department is often found in a crisis situation. Communications are at the center of crisis 
management at the acute stage of corporate crisis management cycle (Figure 6). (Heide 
& Simonsson 2014, 138; Gupta 2011, 55.)  Even if communications take the stage at this 
acute crisis phase, every corporation needs a sound and a prepared crisis communications 
plan. This plan should then be a part of the more holistic corporate crisis management 
plan. Communications plan should include established channels of communication both 
internally and externally and it should be controlled by a pre-planned communication 
strategy. Today, information travels extremely quick and if a company does not have a 
communication plan in place in the time that a crisis hits, company most likely finds itself 
playing catch-up with the media, which is the opposite what the situation should be.  This 
rat race with the media may soon lead the top management ignoring their own personnel 
and merely concentrate on handling the media in order to avoid public relations problems. 
The situation should be so that the media plays catch-up with the corporation’s commu-
nications department. In addition to the media, the staff should be informed just as the 
media should and justifications and background information should be offered, perhaps 
even more than for the media. Ignoring the internal dimension of corporate crisis com-
munication might soon lead to rumors and a lack of morale in the workplace. A third 
party to consider in these situations is always the closest and most vital external stake-
holders. These include such instances as financiers, customers, and subcontractors. (Son-
nenfeld 1994, 127-130; 133; Heide & Simonsson 2014, 139-140.)  
When the crisis hits and it demands fast and out of the ordinary communications by 
the company, it is important that the top management of the company serve as spokesper-
sons to the external environment, internal environment, and stakeholders (Sonnenfeld 
1994, 129). It is important to remain open and honest to the key stakeholders of the com-
pany and not try to shift the blame on someone else for example, even if the crisis was 
out of managements control completely. Companies that face crises straightforwardly and 
do not ignore warning signals indicating possible crises, and whose management remains 
accountable throughout the crisis, usually fair better in crisis situations. (Cheng & Seeger 
2012, 83.) Media and customer rumors caused by a lack of up to bar public relations 
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management can potentially be extremely harmful for a company’s future aspirations 
even if the actual crisis was not that radical or harmful (Steele & Smith & Mcbroom 1999, 
95). 
Public relations management towards the external environment is important as we 
have seen but perhaps even more important is what the corporation does internally con-
cerning crisis communication. In essence, every employee in a company serves as a 
spokesperson and it is important that all of the staff have reliable, real-time, and accurate 
information about what is going on. In addition, to offering the information, communica-
tions management should enable the staff to discuss the situation and its implications 
amongst themselves and with the management. (Gupta 2011, 61; Heide & Simonsson 
2014, 139-140.)   
Heide and Simonsson (2014, 138-140) have analyzed the internal crisis communica-
tion efforts in line with the traditional corporate crisis management process as was illus-
trated previously in Figure 5. It can though, also expand to encompass the broader model 
of corporate crisis management that was described in Figure 6. In the pre-crisis phase, it 
is important for the communications function to act and encourage everyone else to act 
as active ‘listeners’ of the operational environment in order for potential crises to be rec-
ognized in advance. In the acute crisis phase, the role of communications enhances as 
we have seen. In this phase, communications is responsible for: 1) giving and sharing 
information throughout the organization, 2) facilitating information exchange amongst 
the staff both horizontally and vertically throughout the organization, and finally 3) coun-
seling managers and other workers on how to handle their own communication in this 
critical time for the organization. Post-crisis phase of crisis communication is about 
learning, just like in corporate crisis management overall. It is important to tell the staff 
why things happened and how in order to prevent them from happening again.  
The communications department is probably not the function that will save the com-
pany in the time of crisis and help the organization to make the most of the bad situation. 
Rather, it has the ungrateful task of handling the crisis to the best of it ability and at best, 
it is not paid any attention in the post-crisis debriefing. Then again, if communications 
fail in their vital mission during a time of crisis, they can be sure that they will be in the 
center of those discussions. Communications are rarely the saviors but more often than 




In this chapter, the methodological choices for the research paper are clarified and rea-
soning behind them is made clear.  First, before the actual analysis of methodological 
choices, it is important to keep the main research goal and its sub-goals, presented in the 
introduction for the study, in mind. This is due to the fact that in order to properly reason 
the choices and decisions made concerning the methodology of a given academic re-
search, all of those choices need to be based on the research goals so that the methodology 
and the resulting conclusions and implications offer the best possible answer to the prob-
lems. The research goals are as follows: 
• To describe the implications of the 2014 Ukraine crisis for corporate crisis man-
agement.  
• Describe background events, birth and development of the 2014 Ukraine 
crisis and its possible special implications. 
• Analyze the effects of the 2014 Ukraine crisis on economic activity within 
the region. More specifically analyze Finnish food industry’s exporting 
into Russia. 
• Analyze Valio’s corporate crisis management in the wake of the crisis. 
5.1 Research paradigm and approach 
There are two main paradigms or, methodologies if you will, in academic research, the 
qualitative paradigm and the quantitative paradigm (Hussey & Hussey 1997, 47-48; 
Wisker 2008, 74-75). The choice between the two is dependent on the research subject 
and the researcher’s view on the world and science in it, through the scope of what the 
researcher is researching (Wisker 2008, 68; Hussey & Hussey 1997, 47; Weinberg 2000, 
3).  These views on the world, and scientific approaches to study it, are also called ontol-
ogy and epistemology. Ontology can be described as the researcher’s perception of the 
world and of oneself in it, whereas epistemology describes the way that science interacts 
with that worldview. (Wisker 2008, 68; Hussey & Hussey 1997, 49.)  
After recognizing the research gap and the aim of the study has been made clear, the 
research paradigm is chosen by analyzing the research goals and/or questions and what is 
the best way to answer them through different methodologies. Qualitative methods are 
the best when the study is aiming to understand and interpret meanings of phenomena 
and social structures in their cultural context. Thus, the researcher is an active part of the 
world and interprets it through his/her own eyes, reflecting on own experiences of the 
world. Quantitative methods on the other hand are good to test existing theories through 
hard numbers and facts. In this paradigm, the researcher is more of an observer who 
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makes analysis on the world objectively and does not actively interpret it through his/her 
own experiences and views. (Wisker 2008, 74-76; Hussey & Hussey 1997, 48; Eriksson 
& Kovalainen 2008, 4-5.) The traditional way that the two methodologies usually interact 
with each other in business research, is that first a qualitative research is done in order to 
identify and familiarize with a given subject and a recognized research gap in previous 
academic literature. This research would then be followed by a quantitative research 
where the phenomenon would be analysed to create a more holistic understanding which 
would be possible to generalize and thus create new academic theory and literature. Ad-
ditionally, quantitative findings are more definitive because the researcher has acted ob-
jectively. (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2002, 87-88.) It must be remembered though, that these 
lines are becoming more blurry and more and more business research is done by combin-
ing the two paradigms in a single research (Wisker 208, 75; Zivkovic 2012; 91). In these 
situations the logic and chronological coexistence of the two paradigms is similar to the 
one described previously. The quantitative paradigm is used to create definitive and gen-
eralized findings whereas; qualitative approach is used to familiarize with the subject. 
In this research, the qualitative research paradigm will be used. Specifically, qualita-
tive case study research paradigm is used in analysing the Ukraine crisis of 2014 and its 
implications on Finnish dairy company’s corporate crisis management. First of all, this is 
because there are no definitive answers to be found to this problem because there is little 
research done concerning the subject previously, thus making quantitative analysis very 
difficult. This is in accordance with what Ghauri and Gronhaug (2005, 87) say in their 
book about qualitative research: 
  
”Research problems focusing on uncovering a person’s experience or be-
haviour, or where we want to uncover and understand a phenomenon 
about which little is known, are typical examples of qualitative research.” 
 
The situation is also very novel and the analysis on it is strongly dependant on the 
viewpoint of the individual narrating it or the viewpoint of the analyst. This kind of a 
situation calls for a qualitative approach (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 4-5). Addition-
ally, the phenomena and their analysis are strongly linked to the surroundings in which 
they appear in other words, the phenomenon is very strongly context related. This fact 
was elaborated more thoroughly in subchapter 2.3 where it was argued that the crisis at 
hand is very much a new and different from anything previously. Furthermore, as this is 
a case study, the nature of case studies is that they are context related. Additionally, it is 
very difficult to draw absolute numbers or facts from the corporate crisis management of 
different corporations because the nature of corporate crisis management is that they ap-
pear in their own organizational and cultural context. Thus, it can be said that the onto-
logical approach is close to that of an objective observer but the novelty and nature of the 
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case studied make it inevitable for the researcher to take an active role in order to properly 
conduct the research and create solid academic findings. 
In academic research, there are numerous ways to approach research dilemmas as we 
have seen. In addition to these practical research design questions, it is also important for 
a researcher to make it clear, what kind of philosophical approach does he/she have on 
doing academic research as there are numerous ways to do that. The academics have con-
structed a proper philosophical stance to every imaginable research design. In this re-
search, the study is very much dependant on the views of people and the way that they 
have experienced or perceived the events that are taken a look at. Additionally, the re-
searcher’s own interpretations are important in making findings and conclusions from 
numerous qualitative sources, both primary but most of all secondary. This leads the phil-
osophical approach of this research towards that of a postpositivism. Postpositivists argue 
the importance of the known, much like the positivists, but postpositivism also enhances 
the fact that the knower is crucial in making academic research. Much like the way that 
it is in this particular research. Postpositivism is a very usual philosophical approach to-
wards academic research in qualitative business research. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 
18-20.) 
Furthermore, to choosing the main research paradigm and philosophical positions, it 
is important to choose the appropriate manner to approach the relationship of theory and 
empirical part of the research. There are two main ways how to approach this dilemma: 
deduction and induction. Deduction is about making conclusions and explanations from 
former theory and research, whereas induction is about creating new theory and laws 
through making observations, in other words, empiric findings. In this research the two 
are both present, as it is many times in business research. In these kinds of situations, 
when both induction and deduction are used in the same research, the term referred to is 
abduction. Abduction, by definition, in research literature means the process of moving 
from descriptions and meanings by people, into creating understanding through concepts, 
which are created in the empirical part of the study.  (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2005, 13-15; 
Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2002, 86-87; Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 22-23.)  In this 
research, first the research gap and problems are familiarized and described. This is done 
trough looking at earlier research and literature on corporate crisis management. In this 
first part, deduction is the main approach. The study is then brought to the relevant context 
through the Ukraine crisis and Finnish dairy company Valio’s operations with the Russian 
market. Thus, deduction is also applied at this middle point in order to find the appropriate 
research gap and to describe the wider context of the issue, which is being researched. 
Finally, in the last part of the study, induction is used in order to make final conclusions 
from actual research of how the crisis has unfolded and how Valio corporation has acted 
in the wake of the crisis in order to fill in the gap recognized through deduction.  
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Final, and perhaps the most important methodological choice, in this research is to 
choose case study research as the way to conduct the empirical research. Case studies are 
mostly connected to the qualitative research paradigm and they are used to address com-
plex organizational and cultural issues that are difficult to study through quantitative 
methodologies. Case studies also aim to find detailed information and tend to avoid the 
use of generalized research paradigms. (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2005, 171; Eriksson & Ko-
valainen 2008, 116-117.)  In this research, the study actually consists of two cases, one 
inside the other. The first one being the political and economic Ukraine crisis of 2014 and 
the other the corporate crisis management of Valio in the midst of the previous one. In 
subchapter 2.3, it was clarified why Ukraine crisis has been chosen as a specific wider 
context for the Valio case study. Despite the fact that there are two cases present in this 
study, the main focus must be placed on one or the other. This clarification must be made 
because the amount of information, literature, and issues that can be analyzed in one thesis 
is limited. This research will put emphasis on the corporate crisis management of Valio. 
This is because, it is closer to business research and can offer more for business research 
and theory than the case of 2014 Ukraine crisis. The crisis in Ukraine is, despite the sig-
nificant economic influence, still more a political crisis than anything else. Both of the 
events are very novel and the fact that the crisis in Ukraine is unique in itself (see Chapter 
2 and 3) also leads to the conclusion that the corporate crisis management measures of a 
given corporation are unique and can be justified to study as a case study. (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen 2008, 115-117; Ghauri and Gronhaug 2005, 171.) In addition to this, corpo-
rate crisis management, by definition is very much organization related and needs the 
specific organizational context and thus, qualitative case study research is arguably the 
best choice to analyse it. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 116-117.) 
5.2 Defining the case study 
In the previous subchapter 5.1, it was made clear that case study is the main research 
method within qualitative research paradigm, which will be applied in this research. This 
subchapter will further explain and define the case study, which is being conducted. The 
main purpose of case studies is to study a specific case that takes place in the world and 
find out what can be learned from it. In the core of case studies is the historical, economic, 
social, and cultural contexts in which the case takes place. The most basic kind of a case 
study is on a company or an individual, which has experienced a situation. Individual then 
narrates it in order for the researcher to be able to form analysis and interpretation about 
the case. Case studying is a widely used method in international business research, which 
this particular paper also is. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 115; Welch, Piekkar, 
Plakoyionnaki &Paavilainen-Mäntymäki 2011, 740-741.) Due to the contextual nature of 
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case studies, many scholars, managers, and political decision-makers alike prefer it due 
to the personal and understandable nature. This though leads to the most profound short-
coming of case research. Case study always takes place in a particular cultural and social 
context, which is why it is widely criticized due to the lack of general kind of results and 
impact. In addition, cases are vivid and connected to the environment in which they ap-
pear in. Thus, the impact and role of the researcher in defining the case are enhanced in 
case study research. On the other hand, Welch et al. (2011, 755-757) have argued that 
especially in international business research, where the topics are very often context spe-
cific, the case-study approach can contribute, challenge, and enhance to existing theory 
by adding a specific viewpoint or an addition. Eisenhardt (1989, 546) has even argued 
that case studies are good contributors to theory because they can unfold new and novel 
theories and viewpoints due to their contextual nature. Thus, the nature of case-research 
as a theory contributor is debatable. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 116-117; Welch et al. 
2011, 755-757; Eisenhardt 1989, 534.) The case research in this study concentrates 
around two distinctive events that are taking place in peculiar cultural, social, historical, 
and economic contexts. The Ukraine crisis of 2014 and the corporate crisis management 
of Valio ltd. in the midst of that crisis. 
The 2014 Ukraine crisis is a broad political conflict ranging largely both geograph-
ically and contextually. This research has so far covered the outlines of the whole crisis 
in previous chapters 2 and 3, but by defining the case, the relevant part of the crisis is 
enhanced and put into focus. The timeline that this research is interested in is the end of 
summer 2014 when Russia posed sanctions on the dairy products imported from the EU 
and what has happened since within Valio ltd. Therefore, the sanctions are the main in-
terest in the vast amount of different economic, military, and political ramifications that 
the crisis has spawned. The sanctions bring the crisis from a macro-level into relevance 
for a specific company, in this study that company is Valio. In subchapter 3.2, it was 
argued and justified why Finnish food industry was chosen as the broader case context. 
Later in subchapter 6.1, it will be argued why Valio was chosen from a vast pool of com-
panies operating within Finnish food industry. The main reasons for these selections are 
that food industry was most affected by the Russian counter-sanctions and Valio was 
arguably the most affected company within the industry. This makes Valio and its corpo-
rate crisis management the most important case to study in the context of 2014 Ukraine 
crisis and corporate crisis management from a Finnish business point of view. 
 Corporate crisis management is in the core of the case studying conducted in this re-
search. Much of the case analysis on Ukraine crisis has been done in chapters 2 and 3 but 
the actual empirical research will now focus on the case of Valio and its crisis manage-
ment. Timeline for corporate crisis management analysis is not as easy to limit as it was 
for the 2014 Ukraine crisis. This is because, as we saw in chapter 4, crisis management 
function can be seen as an ongoing process. This leads to the fact that the timespan is very 
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flexible but still focuses in year 2014 because that is the time that Valio can realistically 
be expected to have recognized potential risks from Ukraine crisis that might affect it as 
a company. The case study is also more interested in the internal operations of Valio, 
though external aspect is also included to some extent. The most interest is put on four 
distinctive aspects of Valio’s crisis management: 1) when the organization is functioning 
normally day-to-day, 2) when the crisis hits, 3) post-crisis management and 4) learning 
from the crisis. These are the same as the different stages of corporate crisis management 
elaborated in Figure 6 in subchapter 4.2. 
  Furthermore, case studies can be divided into different kinds of case studies. This 
particular case study on the corporate crisis management of Valio Corporation is an in-
tensive case study.  What this means is that the aim of the research is to understand this 
unique case from the inside out with the cultural and social context of the case in the 
focus. Therefore, by investigating the internal actions of Valio as an organization, a ho-
listic, detailed, and contextualized description as well as understanding will be created. 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 118; Welch et al. 2011 755-757.) This will be achieved by 
interviewing key personnel at Valio. These personnel have had access to all information 
and operations that took place within the organization when Russia posed the sanctions 
at the end of summer 2014. They have also been in the organization after, before those 
events and can thus describe what has happened since, and before the crisis hit. These 
interviews and interpretations by the personnel will then be interpreted in the analysis 
chapter 6 of the research and conclusions will be drawn both into business theory and into 
practice. As argued before, case research can and should aim to contribute to general 
theories by offering a specific viewpoint or additional implications that have been found 
in a specific case. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 120, 126; Welch et al. 2011 755.) 
5.3 Data collection methods and the use of data 
The data for this research is being collected using both primary and secondary sources. 
Primary data is in academic research, data collected by the researcher him/herself, such 
as interviews, surveys or other observations of the world. Whereas, secondary data is data 
that has been collected by some other researcher or institution, for example internet pages, 
statistics, reports et cetera. (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2002, 76-81.) In this research, both kinds 
of data are used to create the coherent picture of events and issues studied. The primary 
data is an expert interview with Valio representatives and its transcription and secondary, 
text documents available mainly through internet sources (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2002, 76, 
81). These documents include such as bulletins by Valio or other organizations during the 
handling of the crisis, news articles concerning the issue, expert writings from various 
sources, and other papers and articles published concerning the matter at hand. As the 
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crisis itself is a very novel one, as argued in the previous chapter 5.2, the analysis of it in 
chapters 2 and 3 has also demanded the use of qualitative research in order to build a 
coherent picture. The understanding of the crisis needs the analysis of numerous news 
articles and other publications and this is the definition of the use of text documents as a 
source for qualitative research. This has been done because documentary secondary data 
is a good tool to analyse historical data to create holistic understanding of events such as 
the 2014 Ukraine crisis (Saunders et al. 2002; 190). 
The interview was conducted as a face-to-face interview with two senior Valio repre-
sentatives at the Valio headquarters in Helsinki, Finland. This primary data is being used 
to find the answer to the research goal concerning Valio limited and its corporate crisis 
management. This is because, corporate crisis management by nature, is something that 
is rarely elaborated in official statements by companies. Thus, interview enables a much 
deeper analysis of the subject. Both of the interviewees were, at the time when the crisis 
hit Valio, in a managerial position and were that also before the crisis and at the time of 
interview. The interview took place in early summer 2015. The other representative is a 
member of management responsible for strategic issues of the corporation and the other 
a management level communications employee. It is usual to conduct qualitative inter-
views with people such as these when running a case study. The interview was based on 
a set of questions, which were prepared beforehand accordingly. Questions were based 
on former literature of the subject of corporate crisis management and findings done in 
chapters 2, 3, and 4.  The actual interview though realised more as a conversation and the 
interview evolved from a semi-structured interview, which was preprared, towards a more 
unstructured interview where the interviewer also made additional questions and remarks 
based on the answers of the interviewees. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 78-81; Saunders 
et al. 2002, 246-247.) The reason for this was the novelty and the specialty of the issue 
and the limited amount of information that the interviewer could possess before the inter-
view about the inner doings of Valio at such a crucial time in the corporations’ history. 
The aim of the interview was to aim for an interview approach that is of a positivist (also 
called realist) approach, where the facts are in the core of the data collected but due to the 
nature of the studied subject emotionalist, interview approach was also present. (Eriksson 
& Kovalainen 2008, 79; Silverman 2000, 122-123). Of course, the feelings of the inter-
viewees were also included in the data because as it was found in chapter 5.2, case studies 
usually evolve in and around a specific context that is experienced differently by different 
individuals. The questions asked of the interviewees were open questions encouraging a 
conversation kind approach to the interview. In addition, the questions were constructed 
as simple as possible so that the interviewees could easier answer them without having to 
engage complex questions. The prepared questions were also given to the interviewees in 
advance in order for them to prepare themselves because of the limited time that they had 
for the interview. After the interview, the recorded tape of it was listened and transcribed 
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into a coherent transcript, which was then used in the analysis chapter 6 as primary data. 
The interview was conducted and written in Finnish for practical reasons and so that con-
versation would go smoother. After writing the transcript, the text was analyzed carefully 
and the key points and reoccurring themes highlighted to help the analysis of the data. 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 78-85.) 
Interview selection: The interview selection for this research does need further elab-
oration compared to secondary source selection, as it is quite uncommon to have only one 
expert interview in a master’s thesis. The number of interviews to be included in a quali-
tative research conducted through interviews is a complex matter. Sometimes a few or 
even just one interview might be enough, and sometimes you might need tens of inter-
views in order to build a coherent picture of the subject that is being studied. The decision 
how many and what kind of interviews are to be included must be based on the research 
approach and methodology, research goals, time available, and the availability of valid 
interviewees. Overall, it can be said that the amount of interviews is determined by what 
is needed to create enough information to meet the ends that the specific study is aiming 
to meet. When the research is about only one case, the need for quantity in interviews 
diminishes as the need for quality increases. (Baker & Edwards 2012, 16-25.) The infor-
mation from a few well chosen, planned and conducted interviews will provide a lot more 
useful information for analysis than a saturated number of ill-chosen, -planned and –con-
ducted interviews. The amount is not the answer when talking about qualitative research 
as it rarely is in qualitative research as a whole. Although a certain number of referencing 
is needed in order to create a coherent picture of the studied subject so that certain sub-
jective views or opinions cannot disrupt objective analysis of the subject. This might 
though, be achievable through adding secondary sources such as documents, articles, 
news, and bulletins into the mix of sources instead of a larger number of interviews. 
(Baker & Edwards 2012, 9.)  
In this research, there is only one interview included. There are numerous reasons for 
this, which will be elaborated here. First, as it was seen in chapter 3 and shall be seen in 
chapter 6, Valio is the only corporation heavily affected by the Ukraine crisis in Finnish 
business environment. Thus, there is not much justification to interview other corpora-
tions just to create a wider picture because it is already known that Valio is the only one 
relevant for findings. To add to this reasoning, the food industry is the only relevant in-
dustrial field relevant to study. This is because of the imminent nature of the sanctions’ 
effects on the EU’s and Finland’s food industry. It could be possible to include other 
industrial fields, but then the scope of the crisis would need to be broadened outside the 
sanctions to include the overall diminishing of Russian market economy, something that 
has already been defined outside the scope of analysis in this research. This research being 
a master’s thesis and the outlines that this fact provides are on one hand for the need of 
in-depth analysis but on the other hand the limited amount of pages. In order to fulfill 
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both of these limitations it is not plausible to include more industrial fields than the food 
industry and thus Valio as a case company. Then, within Valio, there could be other in-
terviews conducted but here the practicalities come into play. Unfortunately, it was not 
possible to get more than one interview from management of the company. The two per-
sons interviewed were the ones with the most relevant information about the crisis and its 
management within the company and were thus chosen as the ones to interview. Also, the 
fact there has been a substantial amount of secondary sources used in the research, a suf-
ficiently coherent and holistic picture the events and their reasons can be created by add-
ing them to the data gathered from the interview. 
The secondary sources were collected from various sources but generally, they were 
sourced mainly from the internet from various webpages. In some cases, only secondary 
data might even be enough to answer research questions accordingly and create a suffi-
cient data to conduct academic research. In this research, secondary data is in fact used to 
find the answers to all the other research goals besides the one concerning the Valio Cor-
poration. In that specific research goal though, secondary data complements the primary 
data. In this research, there are numerous seconda ry sources being applied as it has been 
said numerous times. They are also used to serve many purposes. In the first part of the 
research, they are used mainly to form a theoretical background and literature review on 
the main concepts that are being researched. In addition, to this purpose they are also used 
to answer research goals concerning the Ukraine crisis of 2014 and the relevance of that 
crisis for economic activity within the region, particularly Finnish dairy exports into Rus-
sia. (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2005, 91-92.) The several different kinds of secondary sources 
that have been included in this research are as follows: academic articles and other pub-
lications (i.e. books), research papers by governmental and other institutions (i.e. Euro-
pean commission publications), institutional reports (i.e. Finnish customs), news articles 
and bulletins, and finally the news bulletins by the Finnish dairy company Valio ltd. The 
main reasoning for the vast amount of different kinds of secondary data being used in this 
research is the novelty of the issue and the lack of sufficient academic research. In addi-
tion, the fact that this kind of political and crisis management issues, especially novel 
ones, are heavily dependent on the source’s own agenda it is important to include several 
different aspects and views from different sources. (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2005, 91-96.) 
5.4 Trustworthiness of the study 
All well-executed academic studies, theses, and other publications include an evaluation 
of the trustworthiness of the performed research and its methodology (Ghauri & 
Gronhaug 2005, 216-217).  This study is no exception to that rule. In this subchapter, the 
trustworthiness of the performed research and its data analysis will be looked at critically. 
54 
This is done, in order to give the reader sufficient information to evaluate the findings 
and implications of the paper in correct context.  
Trustworthiness of a study is about the researcher reasoning why his/her findings, and 
other contents of the study, should or should not be paid attention or taken into account 
in future research (Lincoln & Guba 1985, 290). Some researchers believe that both qual-
itative and quantitative research can be assessed using the same criteria but due to the 
epistemological differences between the two, qualitative should be assessed from its own 
starting points (Tynjälä 1991, 387; Mäkelä 1990, 47). It is common in qualitative research 
to use only one criterion when assessing the trustworthiness of the study. In this research 
the criteria created by Klaus Mäkelä (1990) will be applied. Mäkelä (1990, 47-48) has 
found four criteria that should be assessed when looking into the trustworthiness of a 
qualitative research: 1) the significance of research material and the societal or cultural 
placement of it, 2) the sufficiency of material, 3) the coverage of the analysis, and finally 
4) the ability to evaluate the analysis and to repeatability of it. All of these four will be 
gone through individually in order to determine the trustworthiness of this study. 
The significance of research material and the societal or cultural placement of it: 
This research has analysed two kinds of material: an expert interview and a mainly online 
document analysis. The research findings would be more holistic and concrete if it would 
have been possible to conduct more interviews. The way it was done now gives signifi-
cance especially for the analysis of Valio corporation’s inner doings but lacks a bench-
mark against, which these findings could be compared. In addition, the fact that the inter-
view was conducted in Finnish and the findings and implications then translated into Eng-
lish is a factor that needs to be stated. (Mäkelä 1990, 48-52; Baker & Edwards 2012, 5-
6.) 
The substantial secondary data aims to fill in this void but interviews or other primary 
data would have been better to serve the purpose. The vast analysis of secondary data 
derived mainly from online sources, has aimed to give a holistic picture by including 
different kinds of documents from different sources (i.e. company websites, institutional 
organisations, news articles). This gives significance for the material, as it has not been 
collected from just one source. However, generally the nature of secondary data is that it 
is not usually created for the purpose of the study that it is used in. The reasons and aims 
for the creation of these secondary data is usually something else, a company trying to 
give its opinion or an institution trying to affect political decision makers (Ghauri & 
Gronhaug 2005, 91.) In this research, the most untrustworthy secondary data is the one 
provided by Valio. It is only the one company’s viewpoint and opinion. It has been tried 
to benchmark the findings from data from Valio with other secondary data but it is a 
difficult task. Societally and culturally overall, the research material is thus quite one-
sided. The interview is just one viewpoint of the crisis and its management in a single 
company. Even though, the documents have been collected holistically, it gives only the 
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Finnish and “Western” viewpoint. It has been the aim to include also other than “West-
ern” publications in the secondary data but due to the language used, there has been sub-
stantially more available that than any others.  (Mäkelä 1990, 48-52; Eriksson & Ko-
valainen 2008, 97-99; Ghauri & Gronhaug 2005; 96-98.) 
The sufficiency of material: There is no simple rule on how much material is enough 
in qualitative research. Too little does not offer a holistic overall picture needed for in-
depth analysis, but too much may drown the important findings in the abundance of ma-
terial. Basic rule is to collect material that amount when if one collects more, no new 
findings appear. In this research, the amount of primary data is quite small, but when 
considering the reasoning given in subchapter 5.3.1, it can be said that this one interview 
is sufficient in order to reach the aim of the study, which is an intensive in-depth case 
study of a particular company operating in extraordinary circumstances. The interview 
offers just the view of two people on the corporate crisis management in the wake of 2014 
Ukraine crisis. More interviews would naturally be better but due to reasons given previ-
ously and practicalities, this was not possible in this research. The online document anal-
ysis is more holistic and quite a lot documents were gone through as the references of this 
research show. In addition, it was the aim of the document analysis to collect documents 
from various sources. The great use of “western” sources might have led to a saturation 
of arguments when the aim has been to include as many different publications and view-
points, but the West is quite unanimous on the issues concerning the Ukraine crisis. Then 
again, when thinking about the corporate crisis management analysis the availability of 
documents is quite limited as the study concentrates on one particular company. It would 
be better to be able to include sources from different publishers other than Valio but in 
relevance of this study, it was not seen that important due to reasons described in sub-
chapter 5.3.1 and previously in this subchapter. (Mäkelä 1990, 52; Eriksson & Kovalainen 
2008, 97-99.) 
The coverage of the material: The coverage of material is about the researcher mak-
ing his conclusions and findings based on all the material and using the same criteria 
when going through all of it. The findings should not be based on random pickings from 
a transcript or a single document. In this research, the findings have been justified mainly 
using more than just one piece of material. It has been the aim of the research to include 
as much different viewpoints in order to achieve as much objectivity as possible due to 
the lack of academic publications concerning the subject because of its novelty. It is 
though clear that just one interview offers significant challenges to be able to make ho-
listic findings of the subjects studied. The findings from the interview are supported by 
the findings made in document analysis and vice versa. (Mäkelä 1990, 52-53.) 
The ability to evaluate the analysis and the repeatability of it: The ability to eval-
uate the analysis is about the reader’s ability to evaluate the reasoning of the researcher 
and that he/she is given the preconditions to accept or disagree with the findings of the 
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researcher. In this research the analysis, its methods and the reasons for the choices in the 
process have been explicitly discussed and reasoned. Particular attention has been given 
to reasoning and openly discussing the different subjects and their possible shortcomings 
concerning academic research. It is possible for the reader to understand the analysis and 
evaluate it.  
The repeatability of the analysis means that another researcher would be able to repeat 
the analysis and its conclusions by using the same methods and interpretation that have 
been used in this research. It would be difficult to repeat this research using the same 
methods and sources. The main reason for this is not the inadequacy of the researcher but 
rather the novelty of the issue. The fact that this subject is very novel gives the researcher 
a lot of freedom in choosing his/her sources and the reasoning by which the data is ana-
lysed. Also the situation is still evolving at the time of this study so more and more data 
is available continuously, which puts future researches in different situation than this 















6 DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter will move the focus of the research towards data analysis and conclusions. 
Additionally, case company, Valio limited, will be introduced and Valio’s point of view 
to the 2014 Ukraine crisis will be made visible. The other major theme in this chapter is 
the data analysis. It is divided into three parts according to the three research goals iden-
tified in the introduction to this research. Analysis made in this chapter will create the 
baseline for key findings and discussion of this study in the following chapter 7. 
6.1 Case company - Valio Oy 
Valio dairy company was originally founded in 1905 as a dairy cooperative named 
Voinvienti-osuusliike Valio (translation: Butter export-Cooperative Valio). Its original 
purpose was to serve as an export co-operative to the English market for Finnish dairies 
that produced high quality butter. Russian market was first established as an export des-
tination for Valio already in 1908, so Russian market has a long history for Valio, more 
than a hundred years. Several expansions, name changes, and establishment of many for-
eign subsidiaries later, the current Valio ltd. was founded in 1992. At the same time, the 
marketing of owner dairies became part of the company’s operations.  In 1994, the Rus-
sian subsidiary of Valio, OOO Valio, was founded in Saint Petersburg, and since then, 
the importance of Russian market has only grown for Valio and its owner dairies. The 
modern history of Valio after 2000 has included several new product segment launches 
and otherwise expansion of the operations. Today, Valio has 4600 employees, its turnover 
is around 2 billion euros, and its yearly investments in 2014 were more than MEUR 150. 
These numbers make Valio one of the biggest companies in Finland. Overall, Valio is a 
well-managed and a successfully functioning company and it is still owned by Finnish 
dairy farmers and functions as a cooperative. The fact that Valio functions as a coopera-
tive for Finnish dairy farmers all over Finland, leads to the fact that as the corporation is 
affected negatively by the markets, the subcontracting network will also be affected 
straightforwardly. That network then basically translates to most of dairy farmers around 
Finland. The Finnish ministry of finance (2014, 7) has analyzed that should the sanctions 
by the Russian government stand, the effects on Valio will most likely lead to pressure 
on Finnish dairy production, weakening of production prices, and decrease in profitability 
throughout the supply chain of Valio. (Valio.fi 2015a; Valio 2015a, 6; Canadean 2014; 
Marketline 2014; Lampronakis 2013, 85-86.)  
The fact that Valio is a cooperative owned by Finnish dairy producers makes it a quite 
different company from traditional limited companies. For example, the success of the 
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company is not analyzed by the profit or turnover it generates. These bookkeeping num-
bers for ‘profit’ and ‘turnover’ are only for bookkeeping purposes. The way that the yearly 
performance of the company is valued by its owners is through a number generated by 
Valio for itself, “milk return”. It represents the amount of money that the company was 
able to pay back to its owners for each liter of milk that was produced for the corporation 
during a given fiscal year. Milk return in 2014 was around 43 cents/liter but what is note-
worthy is that before the sanctions were posed by the Russian government, Valio was 
preforming in a record pace. The number at the end of the year is the lowest in five years 
for the company with no significant improvement in sight for 2015. In 2014, the amount 
of milk that was produced for the corporation by its owners totaled in 1929 million liters, 
which is approximately 5 million liters of raw milk being delivered daily. (Valio.fi 
2015a.) This kind of quantities require very efficient and sophisticated logistics networks 
in order for the raw milk to be delivered to the correct factories to be manufactured and 
refined into dairy products, which can then be sold for retailers either domestically or 
internationally.  
Despite the fact that the performance of the company is measured in milk return, it is 
noteworthy to look into the more common financial numbers of the company in order to 
create a coherent picture of its operations and the size of the company. Valio’s turnover 
has been around BEUR 2 yearly after 2010 and despite the economic downturn; the com-
pany has remained quite profitable averaging at MEUR 50 of profit from 2010 to 2013. 
The latest fiscal year 2014 marked a decrease in both turnover and profit for Valio ltd. Its 
net loss totaled at MEUR -36 and turnover decreased by 3,9% with most of the decrease 
coming from international sales where the decrease was 9,1%. The board of director’s at 
Valio recognize the sanctions put in place by the Russian government on dairy imports 
from the EU and the overall weakening of the purchasing power in Finland as the main 
reasons for the weakening economic situation of the company. (Valio 2015a.) 
Valio operates both as a manufacturer and as a distributor of dairy products. It is head-
quartered in Helsinki, Finland but has five foreign subsidiaries in Estonia (Valio Eesti 
AS), USA (Valio USA), Sweden (Valio Sverige Ab), China (Valio Shanghai ltd.) and 
Russia (OOO Valio). Manufacturing facilities it has 15 in Finland, 2 in Estonia, 1 in Bel-
gium, and 1 in Russia. The product offering of Valio consist mainly of dairy products 
with milk being the major segment and lactose-free products another major key segment. 
In addition to dairy products, Valio also offers yoghurts and juice drinks. Valio’s subsid-
iaries in foreign markets are mainly responsible for sales, marketing, and distribution of 
Valio’s products in their respective markets. Some of them like Valio Baltics in Estonia 
and OOO Valio in Russia have manufacturing and refining facilities for some certain 
product segments. The foreign market operations of Valio have historically been success-
ful and profitable much like the domestic operations, which has enabled Valio to establish 
itself as the market leader on the Finnish dairy market. (Canadean 2014; Marketline 2014; 
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Valio 2015a; Valio.fi 2015a; Lampronakis 2013, 85-86.) It is important to notice that as 
Valio is owned by Finnish milk producers there is not that much incentive for the com-
pany to start establishing substantial manufacturing facilities outside Finland as then the 
milk would need to be subcontracted from local farmers and producers. Thus, leaving 
Finnish farmers’ raw milk without a market possibly. As Valio’s first name indicates, its 
purpose is to serve precisely as an export cooperative for farmers in Finland. 
6.1.1 Valio and Russia 
The importance of the Russian market for Valio, and thus the impact that the Russian 
government’s sanctions on its revenue creation is the reason why Valio has been chosen 
as the case company in this research. The next subchapter, 6.1.2 will look more closely 
into this subject. In this chapter, the relevance of the Russian market for Valio will be 
clarified and the company selection justified. Valio operates its Russian market functions 
through its wholly owned subsidiary OOO Valio, which is headquartered in Saint Peters-
burg, Russia (Valio.ru 2015). Valio has been on the Russian market basically since the 
foundation of the company and in 1994 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union the sub-
sidiary was founded to enhance the operations in the newly formed Russian market econ-
omy. In 2012, the turnover from the Russian market accounted for 17% of the overall 
turnover of the corporation and it totaled MEUR 341. The significance of the Russian 
market is underlined by the fact that in 2014 the value of all of Valio’s international op-
erations was 450€. Therefore, the Russian market accounts for much more than a half of 
Valio’s total international revenue. Even though the years are different, this gives an idea 
of the importance of the Russian market for Valio. (Valio.fi 2015b; Valio.ru 2015; Dair-
yindustries 2014; Maaseudun tulevaisuus 2012.) Valio employed on average 475 people 
in Russia during 2014, which was the most of all the wholly owned subsidiaries of Valio 
ltd. This accounts for a little over 10% of the whole staff of Valio ltd. At the end of 2014 
though, Valio had cut its personnel in Russia down to 354, with more cuts planned for 
2015. Valio announced a need for personnel cuts in its Russian operations in 2014. The 
total cuts totaled at 209 employees. These arrangements mean that the Russian subsidiary, 
OOO Valio will no longer be the largest subsidiary in terms of personnel. (Valio 2015a.) 
OOO Valio is responsible for the sale, marketing, importing, and the delivery of 
Valio’s products on the Russian market. Even though it is headquartered in Saint Peters-
burg, it owns and operates a processed cheese manufacturing facility and a logistics center 
in Odintsovo, near Moscow. The manufacturing facility began operations in 2009 with 
an initial investment of MEUR 60. Main target market segments for Valio in Russia are 
the biggest cities, mainly Moscow and Saint Petersburg. (Canadean 2014; dairyindustries 
2014.) Although Valio has these own facilities located in Russia, absolutely the most of 
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the products that it sells and distributes in Russia are imported from outside Russian bor-
ders. The main source factories being in Finland and in Estonia, both of which are EU 
member countries with a long border with Russia. (Dairyindustries 2014.) Overall, it can 
be said that, Valio has been successful in its Russian operations. Its products have won 
several “Product of the year” –awards, which rank products according to their sales vol-
ume. Especially, Valio has had success with its butter brands which have in addition to 
sales volume awards, also won marketing awards in Russia for best marketing efforts. 
The Russian market has been one that has been able to remain profitable and even increase 
volume despite the financial crisis that has been rocking Europe for years. (Goodnews-
finland 2012; Suomen kuvalehti 2011; Maaseudun tulevaisuus 2012.)  
6.1.2 Valio and the 2014 Ukraine crisis 
In sub-chapter 3.2 it was shown why Finnish food industry and more specifically the 
Finnish dairy industry was selected as the wider context for this case research. This chap-
ter will continue that justification by offering insight why Valio is an interesting company 
to examine in terms of 2014 Ukraine crisis. Particularly, the crisis’ effects on individual 
companies operating in the economic region will be analyzed. The methodological ap-
proach on case selection will be done in later.  
Valio’s Russian operations have been a success story for both the company and the 
Finnish dairy industry as it has been shown. All this though, came to a sudden halt during 
the summer of 2014, on August 8. That day, the Russian government posed an import 
embargo and sanctions on dairy products from the European Union for a duration of one 
year. In a heartbeat, Valio faced a loss in turnover that totaled almost 20% of its total 
revenue for the next 12 months (Dairyindustries 2014). Any company, no matter how 
profitable, would be concerned over its operations and capability to perform if such a vast 
cut in its revenue resulted out of nowhere. What makes the situation ever more saddening 
is the fact that Valio was performing well during the first half of 2014 with milk returns 
paid to producers being historically high despite the economic recession still weighing on 
Finnish economy, before the events more than 1000km away suddenly changed every-
thing (Valio 2015a). 
Valio’s Russian operations include both manufacturing in Russia and importing from 
neighboring countries into Russia. Most of the imported products come from Finland and 
Estonia, both of which are members of the EU. Thus, this side of Valio’s Russian opera-
tions came to a complete halt in August 2014. The manufacturing in Russia and the sales 
of these products manufactured in Russia naturally continued as usual and kept creating 
revenue for the company.  
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When things started to unfold at the end of 2013 and in the beginning of 2014 in the 
capital city of Ukraine, Kiev as elaborated in chapter 2, the events must have not seen 
that far reaching. A company from one of the northern most countries in Europe probably 
felt that this was just another quarrel in a long line of similar ones during the last 20 years 
in the region of Eastern Europe, which could be traced back to the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. Then again, in hindsight, it is easier to say that the tension between Russia 
and the EU started to build up quite quickly as the Crimean peninsula came into play 
during the spring of 2014. At this point the alarm clocks should start ringing and the 
“active ears” that have been observing the environment of the company should start indi-
cating that there might be something here that the company should consider. At the latest, 
when the EU and the US started posing their sanctions on Russian individuals, companies, 
and institutions the potential crisis must have seen evident. Considering the Russian gov-
ernment’s past, it was very unlikely that they would just accept these restrictions without 
any counteractions. Then again, there are countless different ways and targets that the 
Russian government could pose its countersanctions against. However, the added fact that 
Russia had already posed a seemingly overcautious embargo on all meat products from 
the EU in the beginning of 2014 because of cases of tainted meat in eastern European 
farms, would indicate that something similar might be coming this time around also and 
that the food industry might be targeted (Euractiv 2015).   
Then again having a more than 100 years of experience on the Russian market, Valio 
might have felt that they are accustomed to these kinds of events and trusted that if some-
thing happens, they can handle it like before. On 8 August 2014, Russia did something 
that seemed, and still seems, impossible to understand. Its government posed total import 
ban on dairy products and a number of other food imports from the EU.  This is especially 
peculiar because in 2011 Russia was 80% self-sufficient in milk production overall but 
for example of butter’s consumption, which is one of the most important products for 
Valio in Russia, 40% is imported. Thus, it seems quite incomprehensible how government 
could ban import for such a basic food product as butter if the domestic production cannot 
replace that production for the growing demand. (Turku science park 2011 6-7; Suomen 
kuvalehti 2011.) It would seem that the Russian government did get a reality check after 
the sanctions had been effective for two weeks. On August 20 2014, Russia removed the 
ban on lactose-free products. They are one of the most important product segment for 
Valio both in Finland but also in Russia (Valio 2014a). In the empirical part of the re-
search we shall see whether this compensated some of the loss that Valio suffered by the 
initial sanctions or not.  
It has been shown in chapter 3 that the importance of dairy industry for the domestic 
economy of Finland is not that significant in terms of GDP and the overall ability for the 
economy to perform (Finnish Ministry of Finance 2014).  Therefore, even though the 
government would state the worry for individual companies’ ability to perform, the aiding 
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of these companies would not be the first priority because the national economy had more 
troubles managing the prolonged recession.   
The European Commission (2015, 5-8) has made a thorough analysis on what kind of 
implications the sanctions have on the European food production and market perfor-
mance. The most challenged sector in food industry due to these sanctions would seem 
to be fruits and vegetables with dairy coming second. For dairy industry, the commission 
found that companies have been able to perform quite well and they have found new 
customers from domestic markets and new markets. Thus, this focus on vegetable and 
fruit sector would indicate that the EU would put most of its actions on securing that 
sector and leaving the dairy companies to find their own way, with some actions of course 
being taken to help that sector also. 
To conclude, Valio as a company has found itself in a situation, which has radically 
affected the way that it can operate as a profitable company. The events that have led to 
this have been mostly out of the reach of the company management with very little for 
them to do. A giant cut in the revenue of the company has resulted from the sanctions 
posed by the Russian government on dairy imports from the European Union. However, 
perhaps as a kind of Pyrrhic victory for the company, the dairy industry has been able to 
handle the situation better than other food sectors in the EU. Thus, leaving it outside the 
most radical aiding efforts by the Union. Also the Finnish economy has been battling a 
prolonged recession for years now, and the government having to put most of its economy 
efforts on handling that situation, this sudden but yet temporary crisis for Valio might not 
be the first thing to handle despite the official statements. Many findings in this chapter 
have been left without a definite answer but after the empirical part of the research, these 
will be stated also. 
6.2 Research goal data discussion 
 
The data analysis of the collected data from the primary data interview and secondary 
data document analysis will be done by reflecting the data on the research goals elabo-
rated in the introduction and methodology chapters of the research. This enables the data 
to be organized and coded accordingly under different sub-goals. In addition, the analysis 
chapter 6 will be easier to both read and comprehend by the reader if the data and findings 
are organized under certain themes. The sub-goals are at the focus in this chapter whereas 
the final chapters 7 and 8 of the summary elaborates the main research goal, which is: 
• To describe the implications of the 2014 Ukraine crisis for corporate crisis 
management.  
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Both sets of collected data, the primary and secondary, will be analyzed at the same 
time. The interview and its transcript are not included in the references of this study but 
most of the secondary data can be found in the references. The only exceptions to this are 
the internal company bulletins by Valio communications department. They are not avail-
able to the public so there is not much sense in adding them to the references. Many of 
the sub-goals have already been analyzed previously in this study as it was seen through-
out chapter 5. This chapter will add to that analysis and include new information espe-
cially on the analysis of the last sub-goal concerning Valio’s corporate crisis management. 
This is because most of the data concerning this sub-goal is from the conducted interview 
and not from secondary data, which has already been analyzed quite thoroughly. The 
following sub-chapters are named and organized in order for them to represent the distinct 
sub-goals individually. Many of the issues identified in the data analysis are overlapping 
and will thus be included in more than one sub-chapter. 
6.2.1 2014 Ukraine crisis and its special implications 
A lot of analysis concerning the Ukraine crisis of 2014 has been done in the chapters 2 
and 3. In addition, subchapter 2.3 has served as the justification on why this particular 
situation is so profoundly different and calls for a detailed analysis instead of a more 
general approach on political crises affecting corporations for example. This chapter aims 
to draw together different data findings that have been found and to build a coherent pic-
ture of the crisis and its implications. The sub-goal that has been identified in this research 
concerning this crisis is to: 
• Describe background events, birth and development of the 2014 Ukraine cri-
sis and its possible special implications. 
It has been established that the situation, which has unfolded, is in fact a quite different 
from anything that has happened before between the EU and the Russian Federation. The 
analysis (Table 2) by Liuhto (2014) and Medvedev (2008) even suggests that there has 
been a profound change in the coexistence of the two global super powers, which should 
be identified and recognized in order to better understand to dialogue and actions of each 
party. For example, the substantial use of economic power in order to affect the other is 
something that has not occurred before between the EU and Russia. The previous crises 
and disagreements experienced in the region of Eastern Europe and Eurasia since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union have usually been somewhat easily surpassed and the 
relationship between the EU and Russia has not been compromised. In addition, the trade 
negotiations and the evolution of the trade negotiations that resulted into president Yanu-
kovych signing the agreement with Russia, would also implicate a changing economic 
climate. The fact that Ukrainian people (at least in western parts) opted for EU will not 
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help with the formation of long-term fruitful economic partnership between EU and Rus-
sia.  
The friendly coexistence and the economic partnership have evolved throughout the 
years despite what has happened between Russia and one or more of its neighboring coun-
tries (i.e. Georgia and Chechnya). It would though, now seem as that this particular crisis 
is kind of a climax point in a series of events that have unfolded in the last 25 years or so. 
During this time, the NATO and the EU have expanded their sphere of influence too close 
Russian borders both politically and economically, from Russia’s point of view. Conse-
quently, at the same time Russia has experienced that it needs to prove and cement its 
own position as both a global actor in addition to securing its regional position. (Pynnö-
niemi 2014; Freedman 2014, 16-17; Haukkala 2008, 167-171; Laine 2014, 33-34.) 
Economic sanctions are the most important feature of the crisis in terms of this paper, 
which make it stand out from anything that has occurred previously. In addition, they are 
the most important economic implication in relevance of this research because of the im-
mediate nature of the effects that the Russian countersanctions have had on Valio ltd’s 
operations. It would seem that the EU nonetheless, is gaining an upper hand in the sanc-
tion exchange between it and Russia (Finnish Ministry of Finance 2014). However, the 
lack of a broader strategy, at least a visible one, by both Russia and the EU make the use 
of sanctions problematic. Both parties lack a more general view and goals what they are 
trying to achieve. The sanctions should always be a part of a larger plan to affect a given 
entity or a country, not the sole strategy, as they seem to be in this particular case. The 
future ramifications of these sanctions might be much more severe than at first antici-
pated. Especially, because the nature of economic sanctions is such, that it takes usually 
a long time for them to take effect. The sanctions during this crisis though have already, 
in a span of less than a year, had substantial effects on the economic activity within the 
region, both in the EU but particularly in Russia. One can only wonder if there has been 
this severe short-term implications, what the long-term ones will be. (Finnish ministry of 
finance 2014, 5; European commission 2014; Dolidze 2015, 14; Wilson 2014, 264; Freed-
man 2015, 29.) 
However, even though the crisis is quite unique in itself and its certain characteristics 
make it stand out, there are several general theories to be found in former literature that 
can be applied into the Ukraine crisis and its development. Figure 2 and Table 1 show 
that the crisis has evolved quite similarly to any other political conflict and that it has 
stemmed and been triggered by similar causes that are usual for these kinds of conflicts. 
(Rupesinghe 1998.) As the bolded structural/root cause in Table 1 explain the increasing 
tension between Russia and the EU has led to this current situation, which has then been 
escalated by certain details concerning substantial Russian population in Crimea penin-
sula and the division of the Ukrainian people into Pro-EU in the West and Pro-Russia in 
the East populations. Finally, the situation was triggered by the president Yanukovych 
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declination of an agreement with the EU and the escalation of the situation through the 
annexation of Crimea and the economic sanctions. Then the crisis itself has followed the 
chronological timeline identified by Rupesinghe (1998), which is portrayed in Figure 2.  
The events in 2014 Ukraine crisis can be traced to the distinct different phases of a violent 
conflict recognized in the Figure. The fact that the events during the crisis and causes for 
the Ukraine crisis can be traced to these general theories by Rupesinghe (1998) would 
indicate that there is something to be learnt here; rather than the crisis being a completely 
individual and unique situation, which cannot be generalized for further research or man-
agerial implications. The most relevant managerial implications for corporations from 
this crisis are of course the substantial economic ramifications that it has had on the re-
gion. 
6.2.2 Economic implications and Finnish food industry’s exporting into Russia 
It has been shown repeatedly in this paper that the Ukraine crisis of 2014 has had a sub-
stantial effect on economic activity within the region. More specifically, it was clarified 
in subchapters 3.2 and 6.1 why, from all possible implications, this paper has concentrated 
on those implications that concern the Finnish food exports to Russia and an individual 
Finnish dairy cooperative Valio. The sub-goal recognized in introduction chapter con-
cerning these issues is to:  
• Analyze the effects of the 2014 Ukraine crisis on economic activity within the 
region. More specifically analyze Finnish exporting into Russia. 
The most of the analysis here, much like before, will concentrate on the immediate 
effects caused by the Russian countersanctions on Finnish food industry’s Russian ex-
ports and Valio’s as a part of Finnish food industry.  In subchapter 3.2, it was described 
how important the Russian market is for the Finnish dairy industry’s exports and in sub-
chapter 6.1 how vital it was for Valio dairy cooperative until  August 8 2014. (Valio 
2014b; Finnish ministry of Finance 2014.)  
The empirical findings from the data collected from the interview and secondary data 
confirm these analyses. Valio had analyzed, according to the interviewees, that they are 
the company mostly affected by the Russian countersanctions in the whole of the EU’s 
food industry. In fact, to give a picture of the severity of the situation for Valio, the effects 
on the company can be compared to the whole of Germany’s dairy exports to Russia. 
Germany exports approximately MEUR 165 to the Russian market and Valio alone 
MEUR 242, which is some 85% of all Finnish dairy exports to Russia. (Valio 2014b.) It 
is noteworthy than the German national economy is more than ten times larger than the 
Finnish when comparing the gross domestic products (GDP) of the two countries (Euro-
stat 2015). The hit for Valio and for Finnish dairy exports has thus been massive.  
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In subchapter 3.2 it was found that the importance of Valio and the Finnish dairy in-
dustry for the Finnish, let alone the EU’s, GDP are quite minimal. However, in the em-
pirical data it was found that the Finnish dairy industry is quite peculiar in its import and 
export operations. The interviewees elaborated that Valio cooperative is the sole dairy 
company that has considerable export operations that are vital for the Finnish milk pro-
ducers because the import of dairy products is growing all the time. It is thus important 
for Valio to maintain its export operations in order to keep the industry’s import/export 
accounts in balance. This is supported by the fact that Valio accounts for such a vast 
amount of total exports of Finnish dairy. (Valio 2014b; Finnish ministry of Finance 2014).  
In addition to these local effects, it was found in the analysis of the secondary data that 
Russia is in fact the second largest importer of dairy goods in the world (closely compet-
ing with China for the first place). Russia also accounts for a third of the whole EU’s 
dairy exports with a relative weight of the importance of Russian market being the highest 
in Finland and the Baltics. These issues alone are severe enough to describe the severity 
of the situation for Valio. When you add, the fact that the overall production of dairy in 
the EU grew 5% during 2014 the situation is even bleaker. The production is growing 
thus placing pressure on the demand but the demand has collapsed because of the import 
embargo placed by the second biggest dairy importer in the world. The result is inevitably 
the lowering of the prices for the dairy producers in the EU. It is clear that this situation 
has called for corporate crisis management from the biggest dairy producer in Finland, 
Valio, in order for it to compensate the immediate disappearance of the most important 
export market for the company’s processed produce. Valio’s situation overall is peculiar 
because it is a cooperative owned by Finnish dairy farmers as it has been explained. This 
is important because Valio’s sole purpose is to pay as much money back to its owners as 
possible for the milk produced. Valio cannot thus scale back the production in order to 
adjust to changing market situation, because the farmers need their milk to go somewhere 
and Valio cannot exclude its owner dairies from its production. 
6.2.3 Valio’s corporate crisis management in the wake of the crisis 
The previous two subchapters have mostly gathered together previous findings and in-
cluded some new remarks from the empirically collected data. This subchapter will con-
centrate in the last sub-goal concerning the case company Valio and its corporate crisis 
management, which is to: 
• Analyze Valio’s corporate crisis management in the wake of the crisis. 
This sub-goal is the least analyzed and described previously in this paper compared to 
the other two. Former literature in corporate crisis management has been thoroughly ref-
erenced in chapter 4 and Valio as a company and Valio as a part of the Ukraine crisis 
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have been discussed in subchapter 6.1. In this subchapter there will be the most new in-
formation provided compared to previous data analysis chapters. This is because the pri-
mary data interview with the Valio experts concentrates in elaborating the corporate crisis 
management operations of Valio in the wake of the crisis. Furthermore, the interview data 
shows on a general level how Valio prepares for and handles crises occurring in its oper-
ating environment. In addition, the 2014 Ukraine crisis will be further analyzed from the 
point of view of Valio’s management. In subchapter 6.1.2, it was analyzed as an external 
observer but the interview and other secondary document data will offer further infor-
mation on the events and their reasons. 
Probably the most striking revelation concerning the 2014 Ukraine crisis and Valio 
dairy cooperative was the fact that the company had no idea that their Russian operations 
might be in danger completely. According to the interviewees, the political risk was iden-
tified already at the beginning of 2014 but at no point was Valio prepared, or did they 
anticipate, that the Russian government would ban the dairy export completely. The sit-
uation within Valio on 8th of August 2014 when Russia posed their countersanctions can 
best be described by a citation from one of the interviewees: 
 
“It was like a lightning bolt from a clear blue sky. We had some twenty 
trucks heading to the border to deliver dairy products to the Russian mar-
ket, but suddenly they were not allowed to get through. “ 
 
As Russia posed their sanctions, approximately 20% of Valio’s turnover was cut in a 
heartbeat.  Additionally, the interviewees confirmed that exports totaled approximately 
80%-90% of the total turnover for Valio from the Russian market. The rest 10%-20% are 
locally produced products. Furthermore, this economic disaster was not the only imme-
diate effect that encountered Valio. This is where the nature of dairy industry comes into 
play. The millions of liters produced by the thousands and thousands of cows around 
Finland daily in Valio’s owner dairies’ needed to be processed somehow. Even if the 
market disappears, the cows cannot stop producing milk the way a factory can. The reso-
lution for this in Valio’s case was to produce the abundance of excess milk, usually tar-
geted to the Russian market, into industrial milk and –butter. The problem in this was 
though, that the prices and margins for these industrial dairy products are radically lower 
compared to the processed produce that was previously sold to the Russian market. (Valio 
2014b; Valio 2014c; Valio 2015a.)  
The main reason for Valio’s analysis of the situation, in other words the belief, that 
there could not be a total blockage of dairy exports to Russia lied in the following facts. 
First, Russia is far from a self-sufficient domestic dairy industry and it relies heavily on 
foreign imports. Secondly, because Valio has a long experience on the Russian market 
and management believed that they know pretty much how the Russian government has 
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acted in the past and could therefore trust that the same kind of behavior would be fol-
lowed this time around also. Sadly, in hindsight, it can be said that both these presump-
tions were wrong and Russia, despite economic realities, placed heavy import restrictions 
on dairy products. It seemed like Russia was faced with these hard economic realities 
when it opened the border for lactose-free products on 20th of August 2014. Though, the 
empirical data both from the interviewees and documents show that the actual export of 
these products was still impossible as Russia placed a considerable bureaucratic block on 
the border as Valio tried to bring these products to the Russian market (Valio 2014a; 
Valio 2014e). Thus, to this day in Autumn 2015 Valio has not been able to export lactose-
free products into Russia despite them being technically allowed by the Russian govern-
ment.  
The board of director’s report from 2013 also shows that Valio did not anticipate any 
grave changes on their Russian market. The risk analysis of the report shows no change 
in the standard way that the company has evaluated its potential risks. The main risks 
identified at the end of 2013 being the negative development of export prices and the 
weakening domestic demand for dairy products amongst Finnish consumers. (Valio 
2014h.) However, the interviewees did put emphasis on the fact that the operational man-
agement of the company did acknowledge the potential risk already in the beginning of 
2014 when the report of last year is finalized usually in public companies. An interesting 
finding is the fact that in the report from 2014 the risk management chapter is very similar 
to the one in 2013. There is no mention of potential political risks affecting the business, 
just the general negative development of prices and domestic demand. However, the 
whole report of 2014 begins with a strong emphasis on the effect that the Russian gov-
ernment’s sanctions have had on the operations of the company and the fact that the milk 
produce needed to be targeted on lower margins industrial products. The interviewees 
also put emphasis on these as it has been said, and the company indeed was in need of 
crucial corporate crisis management. (Valio 2015a; Valio 2014h.)  
How Valio then handled the situation it faced out of nowhere at the end of summer 
2014? The substantial logistics operation and the rearrangement of production outputs 
have been discussed in this chapter. Now the empirical data will be analyzed from a cor-
porate crisis management point of view; what kind of actions did the management take 
before, during and after the crisis, how has the company been able to perform in the wake 
of the crisis and has it recovered from the shock. The interviewees did put strong emphasis 
on the fact that Valio had very little or no chance of anticipating the gravity of Russian 
government’s sanctions on dairy imports to the country. Thus, there was no specific pre-
liminary plans made. Rather, the management had to act in the moment and trust that the 
company stood on solid foundations that it could take a hit as big as this, but still maneu-
ver its way through it intact.  
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The most visible and biggest action that the company’s management has taken during 
2014-2015 is substantial financial adaptations that have taken place throughout the com-
pany. First, the factories serving the Russian market had to be adapted to the new market 
situation mainly through layoffs. The layoffs were announced a day after the sanctions 
were posed by Russia, on the 9th of August 2014. Then, the corporate headquarters were 
the next in line for adaptation through layoffs and finally the logistics department of the 
company has been adapted to the new market situation that the company is facing. (Valio 
2014b; Valio 2014f; Valio 2015b; Valio 2015c.) Also the Russian subsidiary of Valio has 
gone through severe financial adaptation as its operations are in the new situation just 
about producing and marketing the domestically produced products, which, as said, ac-
counts only for 10%-20% of the turnover created by Valio in Russia until the 8th of August 
2014. These layoffs are the immediate actions that the management has taken along with 
the change in production into the industrial dairy products that are sold to global markets 
with clearly smaller margins.  
Valio was also able to offload the initial products already produced and packaged to 
the Russian market because the management acted quickly and got a permission from 
Finnish officials to do so. This resulted the both infamous and famous “Putin-cheese” –
incident. Valio needed to offload the already packed produce to the Finnish market but 
they did so with a smaller price than the Finnish market was accustomed to. Valio of-
floaded the produce with the Russian market price, which was considerably lower than 
the Finnish. The domestic rivals in Finland blamed Valio for interfering the market un-
fairly, thus the “infamous” -tag on the incident. The interviewees did however also 
acknowledge a positive outcome, which was a lot of publicity for the Valio cheese brand 
“Oltermanni” among Finnish consumers due to the incident. This “Putin-Cheese” –inci-
dent was not a planned undertaking by Valio, it was just an obligatory action by the man-
agement in order to retrieve some of the lost turnover that the producing of these cheeses 
had taken. However, Valio did make other collaborative actions with the Finnish retailers 
in order to minimize the losses from the Russian market. Similar actions were taken in 
the Baltics and in Sweden, which are Valio’s biggest foreign markets after the collapse 
of the Russian market.  
The longer-term actions that have been started by the management concern the survival 
of the firm in the long term. As said, the company is still making great quantities of in-
dustrial dairy products and the Russian market is still blocked for processed products and 
the uncertainty about the future of the Russian market is still very great. (Valio 2015c.) 
The interviewees even stated that the current adaptation of the company both financially 
and operationally is based on the assumption that the Russian market is not going to be 
available in the future either, even though it is acknowledged that most likely it will be at 
some point in time. Nevertheless, even then, other companies’ will have taken a great 
share of Valio’s market share, companies that are operating from countries that are not 
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listed in the sanctions by the Kremlin (i.e. Belarus, Brazil). (European Commission 2014; 
Valio 2015c.) However, the interviewees stated that Valio will most likely return to the 
Russian market when the sanctions are removed but they do not see it probable at the time 
of the interview that they would be removed in August 2015 even though the original 
statement on the sanctions by the Russian government stated so. This indeed seems very 
unlikely as the crisis is still on going at the end of summer 2015. 
The quite straightforward answer to these still remaining problems for Valio ltd is to 
find new markets for the milk produced by the Finnish dairy producers. The better market 
in this respect being one with greater margins than the global industrial dairy markets’, 
and with smaller political risk than the Russian market had. The interviewees recognized 
that probably the shortcoming by Valio that caused so dramatic effects on the company 
was the fact that it was so dependent on a single foreign market, Russian. However, this 
is understandable because if a market is performing as well as the Russian did for Valio, 
it is very difficult to try and restraint that growth and move resources into finding new 
possible markets. Now Valio though, is forced to do it. Who knows, this might in the long 
term turn out to be a good thing for the company if it is capable to find new markets that 
will grow even quicker than the Russian will. 
The company’s top management undertook the crisis management itself. Usually, in 
smaller operational crises, Valio has a separate crisis management unit but it concentrates, 
as said, on operational crises such as burning of a production facility et cetera. This, the 
Russian countersanctions, posed such severe strategic ramifications and risks that the top 
management took charge of the situation from the beginning according to the interview-
ees. Generally speaking, Valio does evaluate and operate its strategic risks as a part of 
their yearly strategy process. Each manager in charge of a specific aspect of the company 
is in charge of analyzing his/her own environment, its risks, and their outcome potential.  
These analyses are then put together yearly to create a coherent risk analysis on the whole 
company, which is then enhanced by the risk management unit’s operational risk analysis. 
As said, this potential crisis had been identified but not in the scale, it eventually unfolded. 
This ongoing strategic evaluation is in line with the finding made in chapter 4.2 about the 
corporate crisis management as a process. Valio ltd considers the corporate crisis man-
agement as something that needs to be done all the time and environment must be closely 
“listened” to even if there is no particular threat in sight at the moment. The single largest 
short-coming of Valio in handling the crisis it was hit by is the lack of the learning curve. 
According to the interviewees the company does not have any specific plans to learn from 
the experience Valio has had with the Ukraine crisis. The learning curve has been found 
an important part of corporate crisis management process in previous literature (Figure 
6). 
The fact that Valio was the single most hurt company in the whole of the EU by the 
sanctions, according to the interviewees, would suggest that it would have received some 
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kind of help either from the European Union or from the Finnish government. The Finnish 
Ministry of Finance (2014) also acknowledged that dairy industry with Valio at the front 
was most affected within the Finnish domestic economy. However, Valio along with 
other dairy industry in the EU was able to find new markets, even if with lower margins. 
Still, they found new markets and could gain profits for their produce. This might have 
been a reason for Valio not receiving that much help from institutional actors as it was 
able to steer itself clear of the crisis somewhat intact. The interviewees did point out a 
helping package from the EU that Valio did receive but it was a onetime aid and as the 
situation is still going on it does not offer much help.  
It was pointed out earlier in this sub-chapter that the board of director’s reports from 
2013 and 2014 by Valio identify a few key risks that might take place in their operating 
environment. First risk identified is the negative development of the prices for dairy prod-
ucts in the retail both domestically in Finland and on foreign markets. Second risk, which 
is identified, is the negative development of the demand on the Finnish market among the 
consumer due to the recession, and increasing competition among retailers with more and 
more foreign competition present. According to the interviewees almost the worst possi-
ble scenario imaginable happened during the time from August 2014 until the end of the 
year 2014. What happened then was that both of these longer term risks started to realize 
and then Russia hit its sanctions. Essentially, Valio was hit by three major risks and it was 
forced to operate all of them simultaneously. Even of the two previously recognized risks 
would have been very difficult to maneuver and would have caused substantial problems 
for the company, according to the interviewees.  
This research also identified the crisis communication as a major field to study when 
looking at corporate crisis management of Valio ltd. One of the interviewees indeed was 
a manager responsible for communications in the corporation and the secondary data used 
is mainly revised by the communications department of Valio. This analysis is then, both 
useful and sensible to make in order to offer further insight on the subject studied. What 
was found was that Valio in fact operated their communications in many ways just as 
they should have, according to the literature. The communications were preplanned in 
crisis plans and the messages both internally and externally were channeled through a 
single person in order to ensure the coherence of the information produced. Also the sen-
ior management of Valio was included in the analysis of what kind of things are to be 
included and excluded from official statements. The one thing lacking is in line with pre-
vious findings with corporate crisis management as whole. There has not been nor are 




6.3 Summary of data discussion 
This subchapter summarizes the main findings made in the data discussion chapter 6 con-
cerning the corporate crisis management efforts of Valio limited. The other data discus-
sions concerning the other research goals have already been made quite clear in subchap-
ters 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. The corporate crisis management though would call for a little bit 
more elaboration and summarizing due to its importance as the main research goal with 
the most business research relevance. The summarizing is made clear with a combination 
of theory and data discussion. Figure 8 combines these two by bringing together the cor-
porate crisis management cycle introduced in Figure 6 and the data discussion of sub-
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organization in its normal 
state = succesful crisis 
management
Valio: Lacking/on-going
 Textbook example of how an organi-
zation should prepare for crises 
 Audits regularly, top management re-
sponsibility and active “listening” of 
the environment 
 Valio was not ready for 
the hit it got 
 Risk was identified but not 
in the scale it materialized 
 
 Ability to produce something from the raw 
milk in order to create revenue for owner 
dairies 
 Adjustment of the organization to the new 
situation was done efficiently  
 Top managemen responsible for the actions 
 Communications acted proactively 
 
• No plans to learn from the 
experience efficiently 
• Documentation and an out-
side viewpoint could en-
hance the learning 
 
• Still on-going at the time of 
interview 
• Valio has not been able to 
find new revenue 
• Valio is still suffering very 
heavily due to crisis 
• Management though has 
done right things 
 
Figure 8  Corporate crisis management data summary 
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In Figure 8 the different stages are shown in two colors green and red. The green ones 
represent the stages of corporate crisis management cycle, which Valio fulfilled excep-
tionally, and the red ones the stages where Valio is lacking to some extent in comparison 
to theory and literature findings made in chapter 4. The preparedness of Valio for corpo-
rate crises seems to be in very good order. Regular crisis audits are being made and all 
the different functions of the company are involved in the analysis and active “listening” 
of the environment. The possible implications of the situation in Ukraine and the tighten-
ing of EU’s and Russia’s relations were identified.  In this respect, Valio performed quite 
exemplary in their corporate crisis management in 2014 when the Ukraine crisis hit the 
company fully.  
The immediate preparedness to the specific crisis, pre-crisis management in other 
words, is a point where Valio lacked in awareness to some extent. Valio was not ready 
for the hit it got so to speak. The possibility of a crisis was identified but risk was not 
valued that high. Of course, this is easy to say in hindsight and argue based on theory and 
former literature. The reality though, is that the Russian countersanctions and their total 
blockage of food imports from EU took everyone by surprise, not just Valio.  
Acute crisis management stage is where Valio showed why they are one of the success 
stories of Finnish food industry. The fact that almost one fifth of the company’s total 
revenue was cut in a heartbeat is disheartening and paralyzing to the best of companies. 
Still, the management of Valio were able to steer the company in very fast succession into 
creating some revenue to cover the suddenly disappeared income.  At the same time Valio 
managed to reorganize the logistics and manufacturing to answer to the new situation in 
basically one day is a show of well organized and managed processes and awareness from 
the whole company. Additionally, the communications department remained on top of 
the situation throughout the crisis and were able to proactively engage both the media and 
other external stakeholders and most importantly the internal ones. 
After the crises has been handled acutely and the company begins to recover, the next 
step is to analyze what has happened and why and what kinds of actions were taken and 
what was their effect. This is probably the biggest downfall of Valio’s management in 
their corporate crisis management efforts in comparison to what the former literature has 
identified as essential in concerning the subject. Of course, the management and work-
force will take a lot of experience and lessons from this crisis to the future but the organ-
izational conscious learning curve is not in the plans for Valio. An outside consultant to 
evaluate what was done and what could have been done better might give the management 
new ideas on how to better the organization for example. Additionally, the possible pos-
itives of the situation might be easier to recognize with an efficient re-evaluation of the 
actions and their reasoning. 
Finally, the last stage of the corporate crisis management cycle in Figure 8 is the re-
turning the organization into normal stage and to the shape it was before the crisis hit. 
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This is of course by definition the hardest one to realize especially in Valio’s case as it is 
completely out of the management hands if the Russian market reopens for them. Still, 
the possible long-term positive of the situation is the fact that Valio is forced to look 
outside the box for new opportunities and markets to create revenue to supplement the 
loss of Russian market. Hopefully, they manage to find new markets for their products 
and the Russian market also reopens. Then the management would be able to readjust 
their organization and cancel the affect of the heavy layoffs they have been forced to 
undertake. 
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7 KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, the literature review on former theory concerning the research goals of 
this research will be drawn together with the data analysis conducted in chapter 6. This 
exercise will be done in order to create both theoretical and practical implications for the 
findings of this study. It is typical for business research to include both theoretical and 
managerial implications in conclusive chapters. This is because, often the practical im-
plications are equally important with the theoretical and future research implications 
when business research is concerned. Theoretical implications will include new research 
gaps identified in this study and possible new changes in the way that things should be 
thought of and analyzed by the academic community. The practical implications of the 
research will be done in the section titled: “Managerial implications”, as the name sug-
gests, most of the things found and elaborated will be for corporate managers to help them 
include the key findings of this study in their own work and organizational behavior. The 
theoretical analysis will cover all of the sub-goals of this study, which are as follows: 
• Describe background events, birth and development of the 2014 
Ukraine crisis and its possible special implications. 
• Analyze the effects of the 2014 Ukraine crisis on economic activity 
within the region. More specifically analyze Finnish food industry’s 
exporting into Russia. 
• Analyze Valio’s corporate crisis management in the wake of the crisis. 
Through finding the answer for these sub-goals also the primary research will be an-
swered as it should be in academic research. 
7.1 Theoretical implications 
The theoretical implications introduced in this subchapter include matters such as new 
research gaps that have been identified during the execution of this research. In addition 
to these future research propositions, there will also be analysis on findings that would 
suggest a profound change in the way that literature has previously viewed things and if 
this research could contribute to that discussion with new points of view and aspects. 
Theoretical implications will be gone through by analyzing every sub-goal of the research 
separately and then elaborating new theoretical findings and contributions from each of 
the problems.   
• Describe background events, birth and development of the 2014 Ukraine cri-
sis and its possible special implications. 
First, there has been a lot of research done, not the least by Finnish political research-
ers, on the political environment between the EU and Russia. It would seem as a result of 
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this research that some fundamental changes are taking place in the way that two super-
powers are going to coexist in the future. The background development and birth of the 
latest Ukraine crisis seems to verify this finding as Liuhto (2014) and Medvedev (2008) 
analyze in Table 2. The fruitful cooperation and economic partnership of the last two 
decades seems to be changing into a close to cold-war relations in the region. Russia 
seems to be more and more prone to using military power to ensure its own borders and 
sphere of political and economic influence whereas the EU and NATO are aiming to 
widen their own influence closer and closer to Russia. The profound difference between 
the two parties is that Russia seems to be doing its expansion by force and the EU and 
NATO out of the joining countries’ free will.  
There is a need for a similar kind of profound political research and analysis for current 
state and future of the relations between the EU and Russia as Haukkala (2010) conducted 
five years ago. The tides are changing and it is important for the scientific community to 
understand how and why in order to understand and predict the future better. Addition-
ally, the research on economic sanctions calls for more attention by the academic com-
munity. There is not that much research done on these kinds of economic sanctions posed 
by countries and institutions on one another, thus also their effectiveness is still quite 
debatable from academic point of view. Overall, business research could widen its spec-
trum of crises to include more external crises. Former academic research is, as it has been 
found in this study, concentrating largely on the internal crises caused by themes such as 
product recalls or management failures. This research has though shown that also external 
crises can have crucial effects on companies and they are becoming more frequent and 
thus demand more attention by the academics. 
The second sub-goal of this research is about analyzing the impacts of this crisis in 
Ukraine on the economic activity within the region and especially on a Finnish dairy 
company exporting into Russia. What makes this analysis particularly interesting is the 
fact that the crisis is quite far from the sphere both geographically and economically of a 
single Finnish company exporting to the vast Russian market. Still, the crisis has caused 
severe economic losses for the company and Finnish dairy industry as a whole through 
several indirect effects (i.e. the trading balance of the dairy industry in Finland, the low-
ering of production costs for Finnish dairy producers). The second sub-goal of this re-
search is as follows:  
• Analyze the effects of the 2014 Ukraine crisis on economic activity within the 
region. More specifically analyze Finnish food industry’s exporting into Rus-
sia. 
The key implication for future research for business academia from this sub-goal 
would be to create understanding on how these kinds of, ever more frequently appearing, 
macro-level political crises affect corporations and what kind of different effects they 
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might have. The external corporate crises are ever more frequent and the academic liter-
ature should follow the same pattern by conducting more research and contribute new 
theory into how these issues evolve and can be handled by both governments and corpo-
rations. This research of course has tried to answer this question but the analysis is con-
centrated on a single company from a single industrial field and this research has been 
done while the crisis is still ongoing. It would be important to learn what possible rami-
fications these kinds of new political and military crises might have in the long run and 
across industries. Findings from this kinds of studies would offer insight on what kind of 
stances companies might take in relevance to these crises, thus expanding the analysis 
started by Banfield et al. in 2005 (Figure 7). Also, the largely used economic sanctions 
during this crisis would get a more solid justification to be used in the future if further 
research can confirm their effects in the long run. Finland as a country and an economy 
is an interesting research subject in this respect as many of its industries and companies 
are dependent on a single quite volatile foreign market, Russia.  
The food industry in particular is an interesting industrial field to keep researching due 
its special attributes. Cows cannot stop producing milk and crop need to be collected from 
the fields at a specific time. These make the food industry quite different from other in-
dustrial fields where the produce is first of all short-lived and it is very difficult to find 
new markets for it as food markets are quite established ones. Thus, these kinds of crises 
pose special problems for food industry as the examination of Valio has shown and the 
industry would benefit from further research. 
The final, and third, sub-goal of this research is the most relevant for business research-
ers as it clearly concentrates on the micro-level of a single company trying to survive a 
crisis, which is affecting its operations and future aspirations. This sub-goal is the one 
that has received the most attention in former literature review and thus also the theoret-
ical background in this research is the most thorough. The last sub-goal of this research 
is as follows:  
• Analyze Valio’s corporate crisis management in the wake of the crisis. 
In chapter 4.2 of this study it was found that perhaps instead of a clear chronological 
one-time occurrence, corporate crisis management function should be viewed as a con-
stantly on going operation within a company with the learning curve being a never ending 
phase of the cycle. The findings on the data concerning Valio clearly show that the com-
pany indeed functions according to the model introduced in Figure 6 rather than the tra-
ditional way introduced in Figure 5. Also the fact that after such a fundamental changing 
in the way that Valio creates revenue, as the Ukraine crisis has caused, Valio as a com-
pany is still recovering and trying to find new markets and ways of doing things. These 
findings offer further arguments for corporate crisis management to be viewed as an on-
going exercise. Even if the company has basically returned to its normal state, there are 
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still adaptations being made and substantial resources being focused in repairing the dam-
age caused by the crisis almost a year ago. This finding is the most important theoretical 
implication from this research. Corporate crisis management literature should start look-
ing at crisis management from this new perspective and abandon the old way.  
Valio has left the learning without special attention and this is in conflict what the 
literature has found about corporate crisis management and how it should be done. For 
future research implications an interesting subject would be to conduct a quantitative re-
search on many companies that have done corporate crisis management and study if the 
finding that learning curve is often overlooked, applies more generally in companies. The 
thing that also calls for further research is the fact to find out whether the learning curve 
of corporate crisis management actually offers much added-value for the company. Valio 
has ignored the after analysis of the events and the actions by the company both in cor-
porate crisis management and its communications. Nevertheless, the company seems to 
have been able to survive the crisis quite well in the circumstances despite this fact. The 
literature however, emphasizes the importance of after analysis for companies’ future 
planning of crisis management. It would be useful to find out whether or not these anal-
yses actually help companies to prepare for future crises or not. 
7.2 Managerial implications 
Most of the managerial implications from this research will naturally concentrate on the 
Valio corporate crisis management operations and functions. This is because those are 
the most relevant for corporate managers to take guidance from. The other research goals 
will also be covered but their main contribution is on things to consider and take into 
account when analyzing your own company’s environment and possible political risks 
that might take place in it. Corporate crisis management on the other hand offers concrete 
examples what managers can do in their own companies to avoid, and/or better prepare 
for situations such as Valio has encountered. 
The first research goal identified in this research has to do with the Ukraine crisis of 
2014. The sub-goal is as follows:  
• Describe background events, birth and development of the 2014 Ukraine cri-
sis and its possible special implications. 
The most important thing here for managers to take into account in the future is the 
fact the political and economic climate is indeed going through a dramatic change in the 
region. It would seem that the coexistence between the EU and Russia, with Ukraine in 
the middle of it all, has led to this crisis during a time span of some 25 years. The broad-
ening of NATO’s military and the EU’s political and economic influence closer to the 
traditional Russia’s sphere of influence just needed a trigger to explode the situation as 
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Table 1 represents. The key now is to figure out how to move forward towards a prosper-
ous future for everyone involved in the unfortunate events in Ukraine 2013-2015. 
Though, as Liuhto’s (2014) and Medvedev’s (2008) findings seem to indicate in Table 2 
this might be much further in the future than one would hope.  
This profound change in the way that Russia and the EU act toward each other is 
something that every corporate manager operating a company in the region should con-
sider. Especially the future of the trade is an important question to evaluate in each com-
pany that trades in this region. This should be included in the risk analysis for companies 
that are planning to remain or enhance their operations in Russia or its neighboring na-
tions. In the case of Valio, it is important for them to evaluate the risk potential and overall 
environment of the Russian market if and when it opens for them again. As sad as it is, it 
would seem that these kinds of events and crisis are becoming more a rule than an excep-
tion in today’s world. 
The second sub-goal recognized in this research as a subject worth investigating is the 
one concerning the Finnish food industry’s exports to Russia and more broadly the effects 
that the 2014 Ukraine crisis has on the economic activity within the region that it influ-
ences the most. The sub-goal is as follows: 
• Analyze the effects of the 2014 Ukraine crisis on economic activity within the 
region. More specifically analyze Finnish food industry’s exporting into Rus-
sia. 
The biggest revelation and implication for managers derived from Ukraine crisis of 
2014’s effects on economic activity is that managers should start considering this kind of 
crises as possibly heavily affecting their companies’ operations. Even if the ways a man-
ager can affect a crisis of this magnitude are limited, it is important to not remain an idle 
bystander, but to try your best to be active and prepare for what might happen. Not many 
food industry managers in the EU at the start of 2014 probably expected their complete 
Russian market to be cut off in less than 10 months. That must have seemed like a com-
pletely improbable scenario for most. The fact though is, that these kinds of crises are 
becoming more and more frequent, where politics are mixed up with the economics and 
that inevitably affects individual companies. As the economies around the world continue 
to grow, to hurt them through economic sanctions for example becomes a more and more 
possible way for countries to “punish” one another. These issues are important to take 
into account when analyzing a given company’s risk environment.  
The political decision-making is also shifting towards cross-national institutions such 
as the EU, where the worries of an individual country, let alone, a company, are far from 
the top of the priority list. These facts make it more and more important for corporate 
managers to try to be active and try to detect silent hints that might indicate something 
might be afoot and that something might happen that will require actions even if you 
yourself cannot have affected the situation in any way. The key to recognize these is to 
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remain active and not idle. As the institutions grow, the more these kinds of possibilities 
arise as there are more actors involved with the institution. 
The final and the most important sub-goal of this research concerning practical mana-
gerial implications will be analyzed last. Let us first remind ourselves of the research goal 
that is concerned with Valio’s corporate crisis management before making conclusions 
on what kind of managerial implications can be drawn from this research concerning it. 
The sub-goal is as follows: 
• Analyze Valio’s corporate crisis management in the wake of the crisis. 
When reflecting the findings, made in chapter 6 concerning Valio’s corporate crisis 
management, on the theories and former literature on corporate crisis management dis-
cussed in chapter 4, it can be said that Valio has indeed managed to fulfill a lot of the 
issues identified in the literature. When looking at the pre-crisis management phase within 
Valio it would seem that there are many similarities to the ways that Valio does things 
and the way that theory proposes they should be done. There are regular crisis audits 
being performed on the strategic and operational level and according to the interviewees 
there are specific plans how to company should act in distinct crisis situations. There are 
also roles being handed out in these plans to managers so the responsibilities are clear in 
the event of a crisis. Therefore, pre-crisis management of a potential crisis has been con-
ducted well and it takes place regularly within the company, which is the same way that 
the findings from literature in Figure 6 clearly show it should be done. The one thing 
missing in pre-crisis management phase for Valio was the fact that the corporation was 
not prepared for this particular crisis. The crisis was not identified and thus the prepara-
tions could not be made in order to ease the acute crisis management phase. This phase 
would have to be tackled by the management in the midst of the crisis, which is not ideal 
in any case.  (Shrivastava & Mitroff 1987, 9; Crandall et al. 2014; Heller & Darling 2012, 
152.)  
The acute crisis management phase in the crisis that took place for Valio has been 
exemplary by the company’s management when reflecting it on the theory. Whether it 
was by luck and chance or due to exceptional organizational preparedness, the manage-
ment was able to steer the company well, despite the lacking of immediate pre-crisis man-
agement. The top management of the company took charge of the situation immediately, 
started to make decisions, and executed them efficiently, thus enabling the company to 
continue production. However, substantial layoffs have been executed to ensure the com-
pany’s future. These actions are recognized in former literature as very risky when con-
cerning the long-term survival of a firm. Valio then should take this risk seriously in the 
future and possibly evaluate if there is some other way to adjust operation, this is an ex-
tremely difficult task though and it is unlikely to find other measures that are as effective 
in adjusting the organization in short term. (Crandall et al. 2014; Janes 2010, 89; Asel et 
al. 2010, 214; Müller 1985, 44-45.)  
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Finally, the post-crisis management phase within Valio is the one with most to learn 
for Valio from the theory and literature.  Valio is clearly trying to make the most of the 
situation through substantial cooperation with the retailers in other markets than Russia 
and by trying to identify new markets and new ways of doing things in order to prevent 
this from happening again. The thing where Valio is lacking is the learning curve of cor-
porate crisis management (Figure 6). According to the interviewees, there have not been 
any, nor are there, any plans to go through what has happened inside and outside of the 
company when the crisis hit it. This is something that should be done according to the 
literature in order to better the crisis preparedness of the company and to possibly identify 
things that could be done better or new possibilities. This learning experience could be 
done as a part of the yearly crisis audit exercise, which is carried out as a part of the 
strategic crisis analysis by the company’s management. This analysis might also point out 
possible ways to better make the most of the situation and possibly find positive outcomes 
that have not been able to be taken into account in the midst of the acute crisis manage-
ment. The layoffs executed throughout the whole company are also a reason to do this. 
This is because during layoffs, tacit information is inevitably lost and if there is some 
critical information missing within the organization about what has happened and why, it 
is important to be able to acknowledge this. (Heller & Darling 2012, 155; Crandall et al. 
2014; Shrivastava & Mitroff 1987, 6-7; Janes 2010, 89-90.) 
Another managerial implication in addition to the learning curve, which can be learnt 
from the Valio case, is how a company should act when a large-scale macro crisis affects 
its operations. Especially, as the company in question is not a multinational corporation, 
with leverage on the political decision makers. In chapter 4.3, it was found that company 
should avoid being idle in the case of a crisis. Shrivastava & Mitroff (1987, 5) and Heller 
& Darling (2012, 152) put an emphasis on the fact that managers tend to see themselves 
as victims in the case of large scale crisis taking place. This is what Valio’s management 
seems to have done. It seems as though they have taken the stance identified by these 
researchers. In the data, it was quite clear that Valio saw itself as a victim who cannot 
affect the macro events taking place between the EU and Russia. This is most likely true, 
but as identified in chapter 4.3 Valio could, and should, have been more alert in the situ-
ation and try and “listen” to the silent signals of what might happen. Of course, it needs 
to be stated, that these are easy assumptions to make in hindsight, but offer some impli-







This research has aimed at shedding light into events that have taken place in Ukraine 
from the end of 2013 until the beginning of 2015. Furthermore, the interest has also been 
in the collateral damage that the crisis between nations and international institutions has 
caused for an individual company operating within the vicinity of the events. These macro 
scale events in Ukraine are commonly called the 2014 Ukraine crisis. An in-depth analy-
sis has been conducted to analyze the relationship between the European Union and the 
Russian Federation in order to gain understanding why these events are taking place and 
what has caused them. Additionally, the role of this Ukraine crisis has been investigated 
and possible future prospects and scenarios of the situation have been made. Finally, the 
crisis has also had an economic impact in addition to the political one. Most notably, the 
crisis has stemmed from political tension but the trade disagreements between the parties 
have also played a role, which has led to the fact that economic tools and measures have 
been used during the crisis. These economic actions taken by both the EU and Russia 
have been most visible in the economic sanctions that the two have posed on each other. 
The most interesting economic sanction characteristic in terms of this paper has been the 
import embargo on food products and thus also dairy products by the Russian govern-
ment. The embargo was placed on products coming from the EU and a number of other 
western countries. This sanction on dairy imports from the EU brings the research paper 
towards the second main theme of the study, which is the corporate crisis management 
actions and happening of a Finnish dairy company, Valio ltd.  
Valio has had to adjust its operations and actions heavily due to the import embargo 
by the Russian government. The company was driven into a crisis and it has had to engage 
in corporate crisis management actions. Valio as a company has been heavily affected by 
the Russian sanctions and the finances of the company have suffered significantly. These 
facts make the Finnish dairy industry and Valio a worthwhile case example to examine. 
Whereas, the Ukraine crisis and its analysis was heavily based on secondary sources and 
the analysis was mainly made simultaneously with the background description in the 
chapters 2 and 3, the corporate crisis management actions of Valio follow a more tradi-
tional research path. First, the fundamental theoretical background is set, and possible 
special implications are drawn to bring the theory in relevance to this particular research 
and finally, the empirical data gathering and analysis are reflected on the findings made 
in the theoretical part.  
The methodological approach of this research has been of qualitative research para-
digm. The research data has been collected using both primary and secondary sources 
with the main weight on the secondary ones. Primary data was collected in a single in-
depth interview with two Valio representatives to learn about Valio and their operations 
and actions in the midst of the Ukraine crisis. Whereas, the secondary data has been used 
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to answer and find conclusions on both main themes of this research. Traditionally the 
first chapters in an academic research focus on building a theoretical framework for later 
analysis but in this particular study, the analysis has been actively present from the very 
beginning. The reason for this being that there has not been done enough research on the 
Ukraine crisis in order to describe it purely objectively. Additionally, the crisis at hand is 
so profoundly different from anything previous and thus needs exclusive detail examina-
tion instead of a general analysis on political crises. The second main theme has been 
more traditionally studied. A solid baseline on corporate crisis management was estab-
lished in theoretical chapters and those findings have then been reflected on findings from 
empirical research to build holistic conclusions for both theory and practice. 
Finally, the most important conclusions of this research paper are divided between 
these two main themes and into two categories managerial and theoretical implications 
and conclusions. Theoretically, the most important findings concerning the Ukraine crisis 
would seem to be that there has been a profound change in the way that the EU and Russia 
interact with each other both politically and economically. The trade between the two has 
been building in coexistence with closer political ties during the 25 years or so. After the 
build up to this crisis, its escalation, and aftermath, it would seem that the fruitful coex-
istence seems to be coming to an abrupt end. The political leaders in the EU probably 
start to look elsewhere for energy and the harsh political measures used during the crisis 
encourage both sides to look for political allies somewhere else.  This profound change 
in the political and economic climate calls for future research, which also leads to the fact 
that businesses in the region are operating in vastly transforming environment. This busi-
ness environment needs to be studied and analyzed to offer better information for com-
panies. Finally, the theoretical contribution to corporate crisis management literature is 
that the management of crises as a function should be viewed as a cross functional and 
ever ongoing exercise. Traditionally, literature has viewed corporate crisis management 
as a one time –exercise but the modern examples would indicate that the learning curve 
of corporate crisis management needs to be enhanced and it must be done actively. 
The managerial findings and implications that this research has found mostly concern 
the corporate crisis management issues but there are also interesting things to be found 
concerning the Ukraine crisis for managers and governmental leaders alike. The profound 
change in the political and economic climate in the region of the EU and Russia call for 
a reality check by managers operating across borders within that region. The stable situ-
ation seems to have changed for long term and the risks and possibilities should be re-
evaluated. Additionally, Russia seems to be more unstable for companies operating from 
the EU. These companies should seriously evaluate the pros and cons of operating in 
Russia. The corporate crisis management implications for company managers are first of 
all that every company should be actively analyzing their operating environment in order 
to spot possible risks and different scenarios that might fulfill them. Export operators 
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should do this across all the markets they are operating in. Secondly, the corporate crisis 
management function should be seen as a constant learning curve. This is because the 
risks and crises are becoming more and more frequent and one should always keep learn-
ing of the previous ones, what went wrong and what was done well. Crisis audits and 
strategic planning are good tools to carry out these exercises as the case from Valio well 
describes. Yearly strategy updates are always accompanied with a risk audit with different 
potential risks being identified in the operating environment. When the risks are identi-
fied, proper plans are made and people responsible identified in advance.  
All in all, what the research found was that the Ukraine crisis has spawned a profound 
change in the political and economic climate of the EU and Russia. This crisis also re-
sulted in substantial difficulties for companies operating in the midst of it all with a spe-
cific interest put in to a Finnish dairy company, Valio limited. Valio, faced with huge 
difficulties to continue operations normally, managed its crisis situation quite exemplary 
with the top management of the company taking the reins and steered the company to-
wards safety. The only substantial lacking in Valio’s operations so far has been the fact 
that they have not made plans how to learn and enhance their crisis management capabil-
ities with lessons learned from Ukraine crisis. In addition, the literature’s earlier findings 
about the fact that crises are becoming more and more widespread and longer term for 
companies seems to hold true. The crisis situation for Valio is still withstanding although 
the sanctions were placed by the Russian government more than a year ago. It takes time 
for companies to adjust their operations and make them profitable again. Nonetheless, 
Valio seems to be holding on a solid ground and the future might hold brighter things if 
the crisis has forced them to look outside the box so to speak. What comes to Europe and 
Russia, it seems that the situation for these political powers is much bleaker than for 
Valio. The cooperation and trade seems to be nearing the cold war relations and the trust 
between the leaders lost for years to come. Perhaps a fundamental change in power might 
help to solve this problem. Finally, Ukraine stands torn in the middle of it all with its 
future still very much in the balance. The fighting continues within its borders and the 
people look more divided in two than ever. One can only hope that the good will and 
hopes for peace prevail. 
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Interview questions for the Valio representatives 
1. Could you describe the crisis from your company’s point of view? 
2. At which point of the 2014 Ukraine crisis did you acknowledge that the crisis 
might affect your company?  
3. What were the main effects that affected your company during the crisis?  
a. How did the sanctions posed by the Russian government affect the opera-
tions of your company? 
4. Was the company able to continue operations normally when the crisis hit, in your 
opinion?  
a. If not, at which point do you feel that the company will recover to normal 
state? 
5. Did the company try to influence the crisis somehow externally? Through Finnish 
governmental institutions that interacted with the EU, for example? 
6. How is the company prepared for crisis situations? 
a. Was a political crisis like this, recognized in your crisis analyses? 
7. Was there a person or a group in charge of handling of the crisis? 
a. Who was involved in the group and how was it formed?  
b. Was there a specific person in charge of the communications during the 
crisis? Both external and internal.  
8. What kind of actions did the management take to control or minimize the damage 
of the crisis?  
a. Was it clear for everyone working for the company why these actions were 
taken?  
b. Were they communicated efficiently? 
9. What do you feel the company should do differently if a similar situation pre-
sented itself in the future? 
a. Do you feel that the management made the best of the situation? 
10. Did you co-operate with other companies in your industry? How? 
11. What did you, the organization, learn from the crisis? 
a. Do you have plans on how to learn from this experience? What kind? 
12. Putin Cheese; was this a planned marketing effort or luck? 
a. The most visible way to compensate the loss of sale, were there others? 
13. How do you see the future for Valio in Russia? 
 
